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Policing, Peacekeeping and Development: United Nations Peacekeeping in Haiti. 
Sébastien Decaens 
Abstract 
The objective of this research is to examine the contribution to development of the 
United Nations Police (UNPOL) activities within the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 
mandates when confronted by situations of complex emergencies. The UNPOL mandate 
is to train police officers and police forces to promote peace, security and development. 
The thesis examines the role of UNPOL within United Nations Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH) several months after the 2010 earthquake. It argues that the situation 
of complex emergency created by the earthquake added additional complexities to 
existing problems within UN peacekeeping including the inability to implement 
suggested recommendations from previous missions and a lack of proper training of 
UNPOL personnel.  Another problem is the confusion in the UNPOL mandate between 
security and development so that in a case of complex emergency, the development 
mandate was abandoned, focusing instead on security concerns. As a result UNPOL’s 
development mandate was sidelined as trainers and UNPOL personnel became directly 
engaged in maintaining security.   
  The thesis presents a case study of UNPOL activities as part of MINUSTAH in 
Haiti from June 22, 2010 until March 22, 2011 and findings are based on an analysis of 
my own experience as a UNPOL trainer, undertaken within the framework of peace and 
development. The thesis is situated against the backdrop of Haitian history and that of the 










Chapter I: Introduction 
The problem: Haiti’s earthquake and peacekeeping mission 
On January 12
th
, 2010, Haiti was struck by a devastating earthquake that killed 
nearly 300,000 people.  This terrible event left many wounded and thousands without a 
safe place to live, as well, it caused the destruction of major infrastructure in the country’s 
capital, Port-au Prince.  In the days that followed, all the major media outlets focused on 
Haiti and the world was able to see the extent of the damage.  In Port-au-Prince, 15% of 
the population was directly affected by the earthquake.  In addition to the deceased, 
approximately 1.5 million people were rendered homeless overnight (Fierro, 2010).  
As the poorest country in the western hemisphere, Haiti’s government had been 
struggling to develop with the involvement of the international community for over 30 
years.  Immediately after the tragic event, Haitian government officials were 
overwhelmed, as all pillars of government had been affected; the international community 
was in shock and the local population was devastated. The situation was made worse by 
the glaring absence of first responders.   
The United Nations (UN) was called upon to be a major part of the emergency 
response.  The UN was already active in the country, involved in a peacekeeping mission 
and other mandates since 1995.  The initial response to the natural disaster was slow. It 
took over a week to implement, beginning with providing aid to meet basic needs, 
including food, potable water and shelter for thousands of people.  The delay undoubtedly 
led to a further loss of life (Fierro, 2010).  
There have been five missions in Haiti since 1995, all under different UN 
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mandates. The current one is United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
which began on June 1
st
, 2004.  This mission had four main objectives: 1) to support the 
emergence of stable and secure transition governments 2) to assist in restructuring the 
Haitian National Police (HNP) 3) to participate in the disarmament process, and 4) to 
restore the rule of law.  The mission is summarised as working towards a safe and stable 
climate with respect to political process and human rights. (UN, 2014)  Prior to the 
earthquake, tremendous progress had been made under the MINUSTAH mission and 
local police officers were, at that point, in charge of a portion of the training of their 
future police officers (UN 2013).  
 This progress was severely challenged as a result of the earthquake, which 
plunged the country into a situation of complex emergency. The country had suffered 
damaging floods in previous years and was slowly rebuilding. On January 12
th
, 2010 as 
the reality of Haiti changed, the reality of the peacekeeping mission changed as well.  The 
UN had to adjust quickly and drastically to the situation, and did so by modifying 
elements of their mandate; putting some objectives on hold and eliminating others 
altogether.  This research will focus on the impact the earthquake had on the roles on the 
United Nations Police (UNPOL), which had done tremendous work in the training and 
development of the HNP prior to the earthquake.  This important training aspect of the 
mission had to be put on hold to address the situation created by the complex emergency.   
The level of destruction brought by the earthquake created a perfect storm, and 
impaired the UN and UNPOL mandates.  Damage from prior floods and devastation 
resulting from the earthquake were added to the litany of difficulties already present in 
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Haiti: a weak economy, political instability following years of dictatorship, foreign 
involvement and an already weak physical infrastructure. These factors challenged all the 
UN development projects in the country, including the development of the local police 
services. This research will examine the impact of the earthquake and ensuing emergency 
on the development components of the UN’s peacekeeping mandate, especially as it 
pertains to UNPOL’s role in training the HNP to contribute to peace and development. 
Discussion will address the modifications that had to be made to respond to the complex 
emergency situation that arose after the earthquake hit. 
As we will show in this thesis, the response from the international community has 
changed from basic intervention, where peacekeepers act as mediators, to more complex 
interventions, where peacekeepers act on a multidimensional platform. In the first UN 
peace operations, the peacekeepers were intervening in inter-state conflicts. In those 
situations, it was clear who the opponents were and the causes of disputes were easy to 
identify.  The main mandate for the peacekeepers was to maintain stable conditions while 
a peace accord was negotiated.   
Peacekeepers are now involved in peace operations where the requirements go 
beyond those of previous armed interventions.  When it comes to international security 
and maintaining peace, peacekeeping operations are the method of intervention most 
utilized by the UN.  As we will discuss, UN police officers now have a dual role; 
providing both security and training during the missions.  Each mission has specific roles 
for the police officers.  The four principal roles of a police officer during MINUSTAH 
were: police mentor, police advisor, police trainer and humanitarian support.   
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The literature review will also reveal that the peacekeeping missions have adapted 
to the development issues.   In this research, it will be demonstrated that in the 
peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH, the mandate of the mission failed to properly adapt 
to the complex emergency that was created by natural disaster.  Supported by the Brahimi 
report this research will examine some of the suggested changes in the peace operations 
and link them to the MINUSTAH mission.  This research will demonstrate that UN 
civilian workers and UNPOL were ill prepared for a situation of complex emergency.  In 
the new phase of peace operations, the judicial system and the economic system 
combined with political and diplomatic tools must generate sustainable peace (Cockayne, 
2009).  Can the objectives of attaining sustainable and peaceful solutions to conflicts be 
derailed by one event?  
The question 
In a situation of complex emergency, can the development mandate of a 
peacekeeping mission be fully applied by international police officers in the field?  Based 
on my involvement in MINUSTAH as a peacekeeper, this research will describe many of 
the difficulties that police officers faced during the Haiti mission. One of the issues was 
the incapacity to satisfy the initial objective, which included participating in the training 
and development of the HNP.  There were numerous reasons for the police officers’ 
inability to reach their initial goals, but the crisis created by the earthquake was the 
predominant one. Were problems with fulfilling the mandate caused by the fact that a 
complex emergency situation arose?  Or was it the influence of a new reality; that the 
international community is now requesting security before development?  
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UN Peacekeepers are now operating on a multidimensional level.  While security 
and maintaining peace will always be part of the mandate, there is now the additional 
mandate  of providing humanitarian aid, as well as monitoring and mentoring the local 
authority.  As per MINUSTAH’s mandate, the peacekeepers had to also help implement a 
democratic political process. The MINUSTAH mandate will be described in more depth 
in following sections.   
Numerous definitions of ‘complex emergency’ have been proposed.  The term 
first emerged in the late 1980s on the African continent, and became a “buzz” word 
during the Gulf War. The international community defines it as situations of disrupted 
livelihoods and menaces to life produced by conflicts, civil disorder and extensive 
movement of people, in which any emergency response has to be conducted in a 
complicated political and security atmosphere (WHO, 2002).  In addition to the 
problematic situations, natural disasters can intensify the crises dramatically.   
This research will argue that after the earthquake of January 12, 2010, the 
UNPOLs were ill equipped to face all the predicaments caused by the natural disaster. 
The thesis argues that the peacekeepers were not sufficiently organized to properly 
manage the situation of complex emergency in Haiti.  When we look closely at the roles 
of international police officers during the peace operation MINUSTAH, we believe that 
in the complex emergency situation, which resulted from the earthquake, the UNPOLs 
could not carry out their initial mandate.  The peace operation had to shift focus from 
development to suddenly devote skills and human resources to saving lives.  We believe 
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due to the political history of Haiti and its geographical situation, the UN should have 




When world leaders meet to discuss stability of the world, peace and security are 
always important topics.  After the Second World War, an idea emerged that the 
international community should, and would, provide help and support in any part of the 
world where local officials were unable to maintain an appropriate level of peace and 
security. This support would take the form of an armed presence.  It had been made clear 
by the international community that when it came to the pressing and serious issues of 
peace and security it could not be left to chance to determine the final outcome of 
conflicts between or within nations, particularly when those outcomes impact the rest of 
the world.   
After numerous conflicts, and especially since the events of September 11
th
, 2001, 
security has become more closely linked to development.  As will be explained in this 
research, the United States of America (US) has directly linked peace and development. 
In their blueprint, which has greatly influenced the international community, peace and 
development fall under the umbrella of security.   
Based on my experience in MINUSTAH, I believe that the US influence dictated 
how the mission was handled following the earthquake of January 12, 2010.  The country 
was put into a situation of complex emergency, where the priority was not on peace and 
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development, but rather security first, and then development.  The following paragraphs 
will focus on the origins of peace and development.  The research will then differentiate 
the notion of peace and development from the notion security and development. 
 
Peace and Development 
This subsection will focus on the notion of peace and development.  The research 
will attempt to explain why security is now linked to development. “Unless you can 
impose order, you cannot begin to rebuild.  All else rests on foundation” (Newsweek 
2001:37). 
Since the Second World War social order, or peace and social progress have been 
priorities for the international community.  During the decades following, academic 
minds linked the notions of peace and development. The idea reached its climax during 
the 1980s.  With the later event of 9/11 placed into the equation, one can easily 
understand why, peace, development and security are now interconnected.  If the 
objective is to establish freedom, human rights, and peace in a long lasting, sustainable 
manner, it must be done away from direct violence (Barnett, 2008).   
After the Second World War, the international community decided that there was 
too much lost in war and agreed to work toward peace.  In 1942 during the "Declaration 
by United Nations" the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first to use the term 
“United Nations”.  Representatives of 26 countries agreed to jointly fight against nations 
that threaten international stability (UN, 2005).  From that moment on, the international 
community would congregate and work to find solutions to the world’s crises. 
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Acknowledging the connection between security and development was one of the 
biggest steps that the international community has taken in regard to peace operations.  
That recognition influenced how conflicts were evaluated, as well as how the response 
would be implemented by the international community (Institute of Peace Academy 
2008).  Throughout the peace and development process, the international community’s 
responsibilities are intensified, especially in post-conflict areas.  
Aacademic debates influence how policy makers deploy peace operations. 
Various theories, philosophies and views have emerged from the academic forum. For 
example, the structuralism approach believes that the causes of development problems are 
situated in international relations, specifically in the world economic system (Kay, 1989).  
The dependency theorists wanted to break free from the monopolistic control of the core 
nations. They wanted a model that would take into account all aspects of the economic 
system and all aspects of the political interactions (Beckford, 1972).   
Also in the academic world, neoliberalism emerged as a term that has numerous 
meanings.  Policy makers seem to agree that the main objective of neoliberal economic 
globalization is the removal of all barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all 
available resources and services. Neoliberalism promotes the free markets as the best 
way, or the most effective route to take when it comes to global resource allocation 
(Makwana, 2006).  
The practical application of these theories and philosophies are met with great 
challenges. The influence of the academic world cannot be ignored and, as a result, peace 
operations have changed drastically and are now multidimensional and complex.   
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Under the UN umbrella, the policy makers that are responsible for peace 
operations come from different theoretical branches and have different beliefs when it 
comes to peace and development.  They are influenced by their academic backgrounds, 
their field experience and the trends of the international community.  Action plans for 
peace operations have each been influenced by the theories popular at the time of their 
development.  As previously mentioned, UN peacekeeping missions were established 
after the Second World War and the philosophy on which the missions were based 
continues to be enforced today.  It is now clear, however, that the philosophical platform 
needs to be restructured.   
Security and Development in Peace Operations 
As previously mentioned, the majority of international organizations have 
embraced the reality that security and development are linked.  In the initial UN missions, 
military troops were deployed as the main form of intervention. Over time it became 
evident that this type of armed forces could not fulfill all the objectives of the new, more 
complex mandates. It is a fact that in order to achieve true development; stability and 
security in the fragile state must first be restored.  
In the peace operations which occur after a physical battle often, if not always, the 
UN deploys the international military.  These operations also implement strategies to 
rebuild the political, economic and security sectors of a nation (Wilson, 2006).  The focus 
of the international community should be on fragile, conflict-affected countries where the 
population is suffering because of a high level of violence.  The UN has intervened in 
numerous countries to re-establish order, post-conflict. Unfortunately, when the missions 
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have ended and deployed military forces have left, there has often been a resurgence of 
violence in those failed states.   
It is now evident that peacekeepers are involved in highly complicated peace 
operations. Some of the classical missions have been deployed for over forty years. In 
contrast, the timeline of contemporary, multidimensional peace operations seem to be 
shorter in length.   The new peace operations have different goals and mandates and with 
the changing of social and political times, they are constantly under the microscope 
(Pouligny, 2006). 
Order and stability in a society are important, especially in the early stages of the 
development process.  They are key elements that will determine the implementation of 
the peace operation (Hills, 2009).  A country that is considered to be a failed state will 
have a very short period of time to come up with a solution before the international 
community will suggest or impose one.  From the first peace operations to the current 
ones, powerful nations have had a lot to say when it comes to international security.   
The introduction of peace operations in the Middle East coincided with the 
beginning of the Cold War, and all major decisions of those missions were made behind 
closed doors. Behind those doors, were complicated political games that are still being 
played today. The UN Secretariat and the Security Council are main actors when it comes 
to the final decisions related to peace operations. It would be naïve, however, not to take 
into consideration the political pressures that the international community contribute to 
the decision-making process (Pouligny, 2006).  
Since 9/11 the international community, highly influenced by the US, refuse to let 
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a failed state handle its situation alone.  It is clear that since the tragic events in New 
York, the international community will not allow struggling states to collapse.  The 
international community will not allow conditions to deteriorate in rogue states. The 
problems of those weaker states are now seen as the problems of the world (Traub, 2004). 
 Since the Second World War, it has been argued that often the decisions made 
by global policy makers are strongly influenced by the US’s priorities.  Since 2000, the 
US has made clear the link between development and maintaining global peace. To 
achieve global peace, focus must be on security and development.  The definition of 
development is a controversial topic and this thesis is not about defining true 
development.  When we talk about development in this research, we are referring to 
human development achieved through actions by peacekeepers aimed at reducing 
inequality. Their actions would also support the 30 articles of the universal declaration of 
human rights.  The American government strongly believes that security issues created by 
failed states are rooted in their lack of development. In the 1990s, the U.S. government 
reached a fundamental policy conclusion: security is important to the development of 
democracy and police services will be a key component of securing that democracy 
(Hayley, 2000).  To increase the comprehension of this thesis and to support the thesis 
statement, it is important to mention that although there was clear transition on official 
documents from peace and development to security and development, the UN and the 
international community had security on their agenda all along.  It can be argued that 
policy makers and world leaders realised that after the events of the Second World War, 
the citizens were wary of efforts aimed at security and enforcement, but instead needed a 
more positive way of dealing with world conflict.  The UN needed to find a more 
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peaceful way to bring about stability and the notion of peace and development was the 
chosen approach.  After the events of September 11, 2001, the search for security was 
again considered legitimate and now openly played a greater role in development efforts,  
though the notion was there all along. (Spear and Williams, 2012) 
 That policy was important, because it not only made the link between security 
and development, but the American government identified the police services as a crucial 
way to obtain one of their ideals; democracy.  In early 2000, US President Bill Clinton 
urged his policy makers to train and increase the number of American police officers 
involved in international peace operations.  The international community has come to a 
theoretical agreement on what democratic policing entails. The focus should be on 
accountability, transparency, and protection of human rights (Hayley, 2000).   
 There were considerable efforts made by the international community to reform 
and improve the quality of police officers around the world, but in failed countries policy 
makers faced serious obstacles.  Those obstacles seemed to be repeated in different states.  
The police officers, in the role of peacekeepers, faced a culture of corruption and often 
were not trusted by local populations.  They were also involved where societies had 
endured decades, if not centuries, of repression. The prescription on how to manage and 
fix these problems is not clear (Carothers, 1999).  When I was in Haiti acting as a 
peacekeeper, those issues persisted. 
 It is arguably more effective and less intimidating to local populations for police 
officers, rather than military, to remain in a failed state throughout the re-stabilization 
period.  Every successful peace operation should have an exit strategy for the 
international community.  Due to the fact that it is very difficult to predict when a mission 
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will be truly over, police officers have been used in peace operations, especially if policy 
makers anticipate a long UN presence in the host country.   
 Based on experience from previous missions, there are predictable changes in 
the host country when military forces leave after an armed intervention: the level of 
stability decreases and the level of crime increases. There are many reasons why the level 
of violence and criminality increase when the peacekeepers leave.  Reasons include 
returning refugees, demobilized soldiers that reunite, the presence of weapons, and the 
high level of unemployment.  Other factors are social divisions aggravated by the past 
conflict, lack of communication, illegitimate paramilitaries, and corrupt judicial systems.  
Also, although it is not often discussed, the long lasting psychological effects of violence 
cannot be ignored (Call, 1999).  According to Call and Stanley, policy makers must think 
beyond the peace process.  The greatest challenge to sustainability of any peace process is 
the installation of a system in which the rule of law is be seen as one of the core values. 
This is especially difficult to attain when military forces had to be engaged in battles with 
local populations.  
 
Peacekeeping and Development 
 
Since its creation, the UN’s principal mandate has been the preservation of 
international peace and promotion of development.  The role of the UN can be seen in 
four key elements: 1) to maintain international peace and security; 2) to develop friendly 
relations among nations, 3) to cooperate in solving international problems and in 
promoting respect for human rights, and 4) to be a center for harmonizing the actions of 
nations (UN, Security Council, 2013).  Peacekeeping deployment is intended to create a 
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sustainable solution to a conflict in a failed state.  With the help of military, police and 
civilian peacekeepers, the UN must be capable of managing multidimensional mandates.  
This subsection will describe the classical period of peacekeeping missions, 
during which the primary goals were to maintain ceasefires and stabilize conflicts on the 
ground.  It will explain the parameters that need to be met for a peacekeeping mission to 
occur. The notion of peacekeeping emerged in 1948. At that time the Security Council 
approved a military deployment to the Middle East to observe the Armistice Agreement 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours.  Since that initial peace operation, more than 120 
countries have sent men and women on numerous missions. Military personnel, police 
officers and civilians all serve as members of UN contingents (UN, 2014). 
There are three mandatory principles that need to be met for a peacekeeping 
mission to occur. The first is consent of the involved parties. The peacekeepers will only 
intervene in a way that will bring a peace to a conflict. Second, impartiality; no side 
should favoured by the peacekeepers.  The peacekeepers are present to maintain, achieve 
or obtain peace; they are not involved in the political activities, nor are they supporting 
one side or the other.    Finally, force will not be used except in self-defence or defence of 
the mandate.  These are peace missions and the peacekeepers are seen as mediators and 
vessels of peace.  With keeping the peace as their main focus, the peacekeepers are put in 
very difficult situations, and may, at times, have to take an enforcement role (UN, 2014). 
  In failed states, peace operations are one of the best tools to promote human 
rights on the field. Traditionally, peacekeeping is one of many elements of a peace 
operation.  It has become difficult to separate the peacekeeping from development.  As 
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has been previously explained, the peacekeepers are now used in different aspects of the 
peace process.  One of those aspects is peace education.  
 Peace education was developed by the international community as a way to reach 
some of the peace operation’s goals. Peacekeepers were used to promote and strengthen 
human rights and basic freedoms (Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
UN 2013).  Peace education, which is promoted by the peacekeepers in failed states, now 
includes the issues of environmentalism and disarmament, as well as the promotion of a 
culture of peace (Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo 2002).  Once again, the 
peacekeepers fall under the umbrella of peace and development: a clear demonstration of 
the link between peacekeeping and development.   
 As per the platform of the UN, peace and security have always been on their 
agenda. Whether a solitary or group effort, and with or without the use of armed forces, 
development cannot be sustainably achieved in the presence of direct violence.  If one 
wants to be able to take action that will help to achieve social development, peace must 
first be established (Ekanola, 2009).  Peacekeepers simultaneously help to establish and 
maintain peace, as well as participate in the development process.  
In the last two decades, the idea of development bringing peace has been explored 
in more depth. It is known that the notion of peace and the ongoing battle for human 
rights are closely related.  Without acknowledging human rights, no one can claim to 
have achieved peace. Therefore it is only under the umbrella of peace that human rights 
can be completely accomplished (Dag Hammarskjöld, 2005).  Another demonstration of 
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why peacekeepers now have a crucial role in the development aspect of a peace 
operation. 
Since 1948, there have been over 50 United Nations peacekeeping missions.  The 
three longest ones are the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 
which began in 1948, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
(UNMOGIP), which began in 1949, and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP), which began in 1964. All three missions are ongoing (UN, 2013). 
The peacekeeping missions have changed over time. Initially used as a tool of 
mediation, they are now part of an expanded peace process.  A review of the 
aforementioned Cyprus mission, demonstrates how peacekeeping missions have evolved 
and how they are now used. By analysing the mission in Cyprus, we are able to identify 
different roles that peacekeepers played.  
 Due to ongoing instability and an inability to resolve the conflict effectively, the 
international community has continued the mission in Cyprus well beyond the intended 
timeline.  With the inability to politically control the Cyprus problem, UNFICYP 
continues to oversee the ceasefire, participate in the buffer zone, and dispense 
humanitarian aid (UN, 2013).   
The Cyprus mandate can be seen as a template from which future peace 
operations have been created.  The mission mandate had to grow to keep up with 
changing and evolving situations in the host country.   The mandate’s goals were to 
preserve international peace, to stop fighting, prevent future violence and to restore order 
and the rule of law (UN, 2013). 
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 The incapability or unwillingness of two fighting parties in a host country to find 
political middle ground has often forced the Security Council to extend peacekeeping 
missions.  Over time the policy makers have had to adjust and modify their approach 
toward the missions and how they would use peacekeepers, based on the way in which 
the issues became more complex and multidimensional. 
Missions are staffed with soldiers and police officers for the dangerous and 
physical aspects of a mission.  At the same time engineers, doctors, nurses and experts in 
numerous fields are called upon to help rebuild and or stabilize failed states.  When armed 
forces and civilians are side-by-side, working together, it is evident that the objectives of 
the peacekeeping operations are no longer one-dimensional.  In these missions, focus has 
shifted from establishing peace between two adversaries to the development of a 
functional society. These efforts are supported by governments and international 
institutions through the provision of tents, furniture and material, road transport, utility 
aircraft transport, portable structures such as hospital and offices, as well as numerous 
other services that are specifically related to local needs (UN, 2012). 
It is important to acknowledge some of the sacrifices that the peacekeepers have 
made: approximately 3000 peacekeepers have died while serving for the United Nations 
(UN, 2012).  There are risks in every mission, and all deaths are tragic. The risk is 
necessary, however, which we will see if we look back at the situation in Rwanda. In that 
situation where instability and devastating genocide occurred, the presence of 
peacekeepers was vital for the survival of the oppressed population.  
In the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the response of 
the UN has been questioned and deemed to have been inadequate (UN, 2012).  The 
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following sub-sections will address some of the changes and critiques that have arisen 
since the late forties, with the objective of understanding the debates and reforms that 
have been made to peacekeeping over the years. Understanding these changes will help to 
explain the course of action taken by the UN following Haiti’s earthquake.   
 
Changes, from mediators to developers  
 In the following paragraphs the relation between peacekeeping and theories of 
development will be explicated.  It will explain some of the changes that peacekeeping 
missions have faced.  Changes that the peacekeeping missions underwent were often 
linked to changes in policies reflecting models of development theories. For example, the 
impact that globalization has had on missions. Globalization can be seen as the process of 
transformation of local or regional phenomena into global ones.  It can be viewed as an 
attempt to unify the people of the world into a homogeneous society, one in which 
everyone works together.  This process includes different aspects of the society; 
technology, culture, economics and security.  One main construct of this theory is that we 
all have an influence on each other.  If we take globalization into consideration it gives an 
example on how the nature of UN peacekeeping operations has changed.  As a result of 
globalization the size, cost and number of missions increased, and the scope of peace 
operations broadened.   
We are now in what is known as the era of modern globalization.  The new reality 
of globalization arrived after the Second World War, and economists took over 
(Hoogvelt, 2001).  Under the modern era of globalization, major institutions such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were founded.  Within the same 
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timeline, the peacekeeping missions began.  The World Bank and the policy makers work 
closely during a conflict, especially in the post-conflict resolution process.  The economic 
system is now an important aspect of the peace process.  After 2001, numerous 
international organizations molded their plan for global stability into a framework that 
incorporated politics, economy, social priorities and security (UN, 2005).  This has been 
referred to as “the 9/11 effect”, and as we will see, it influenced the way MINUSTAH 
was managed after the earthquake. 
In the last sixty years, the international community has made efforts to help 
alleviate poverty.  In early 2000, the United Nations came up with the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).  The international community, which was focused on 
economic growth as a way to improve the livelihood of the less fortunate, decided to 
focus on people-centered approaches.  The MDGs had eight goals, the last one: “Develop 
a global partnership for development” is the one that is closely linked to peacekeeping. 
This goal speaks to the need for peacekeepers to play a role in development.  
Because of Haiti’s political environment, lack of economic resources and constant 
social turmoil, the five peace operations supported by the UN did not obtain the success 
expected (Zanotti, 2008).  The mandates of the missions did not always bring the 
expected results. Policy makers had predicted that peace operations would create 
democratic peace.  The missions did not produce peace and order, and they did not 
accelerate development.  As explained in the Brahimi report, mandates for the UN’s 
peace operations were not clear enough. This was the case in the Haiti missions. 
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In the late 1950s, the international community agreed to deploy the first armed 
mission under the United Nations.  The main objective of this armed mission was not to 
mediate and support the resolution process of a long dispute, nor was it to help in 
rebuilding. The very limited goal was to prevent and stop the acceleration of a violent 
conflict (Jones and Dobbins, 2006).  Peacekeeping in that case was limited to preserving 
ceasefires and soothing situations on the ground; they offered important support in the 
efforts of resolving conflict by peaceful means.   
“UN Peacekeeping was born at a time when Cold War rivalries frequently 
paralyzed the Security Council.” (UN, 2013).  Because of that reality, it was often very 
difficult for the Security Council to take a decision that would satisfy all the members. 
This political reality over time led to expansion of the responsibilities of UN 
peacekeeping operations. 
 Although the mandate differs from mission to mission, the original objective 
remains: to find the best solution to any international peace and security threats. UN 
peacekeepers have been deployed all around the globe to avert the eruption of 
international and national conflicts, to supervise and control violence.  The peacekeepers 
are also involved in supporting national actors in defending and building peace after 
conflicts (UN, 2013).  The increasingly complex nature of the situations required greater 
assistance from civilians with specialized knowledge in different sectors such as 
administrators, police officers, legal experts and humanitarian experts.  
The entrance of civilians in UN peacekeeping missions marked the beginning of 
the consolidation phase. In subsequent missions civilians and members of the forces 
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joined their skills, working toward the same goal: resolving conflicts in the most peaceful 
manner possible.  During that period the number of military figures was reduced 
substantially, but the numbers of missions were the same.  The UN had to respond to 
missions that required a higher level of complexity (UN, 2010).  The results were not 
meeting the expectations of the international community.   
The consolidation phase led into a multidimensional period which occurred after 
the Cold War.   These peace operations continued to deploy military and civilian 
peacekeepers, and were designed to ensure the creation and the execution of the peace 
agreements. The intention was to build the platform for sustainable peace (UN, 2013). 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the notion of peacekeeping and peace building 
were merged.  Missions were expected to build a sustainable institution of governance, 
and at the same time, they were expected to help in the promotion and protection of 
human rights.  Peacekeepers had to be involved in numerous development fields, but their 
basic roles, like that of disarmament, remained important.  The issue was, and still is, that 
a massive military deployment is not built to handle the public security challenges that 
countries in post-conflicts states are facing (T. Donais, 2004).  
In early 2000, the United Nations had deployed over 9000 civilian police 
(CIVPOL) around the world (Miyet, 2000).  While the training and monitoring aspect of 
peacekeeping operations remain, they were no longer their main objectives.  Police 
officers were now allowed to carry their personal weapons and in some cases to enforce 
the law.  The mission of Kosovo and East Timor are good examples of that.  In 1997, the 
President of the Security Council, in a UN Press Release, recognised the importance of 
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police members and acknowledged that they now have to be involved in a larger mandate: 
“ The civilian police perform indispensable functions in monitoring and training national 
police forces and can play a major role, through assistance to local police forces, in 
restoring civil order, supporting the rule of law and fostering civil reconciliation, 
(moreover the UNSC) sees an increasingly important role for civilian police.” (UN Press 
Release, 1997). 
We acknowledge the importance of a strong military presence to support missions, 
especially in volatile states, but the establishment of a strong police presence is the key 
for a sustainable resolution of the conflict (Wilson, 2006).  This is a significant point 
because the increased numbers of police officers and civilians coincide with the 
beginning of the multi-faceted and multidimensional peace operations. As formerly 
mentioned, most recently, the UN had to intervene in interstate conflicts, where the old 
model was not as efficient.  As we have seen in this research, the classic model was for 
the peacekeepers to intervene when there was a clear dispute between two groups with 
different beliefs and different objectives that could not be resolved otherwise. In 1995, 
Haiti was one of the first countries where the UN mainly used civilian police as the 
principal physical presence to operate during their mission.  In 1999, the mission in 
Kosovo, which was considered the most successful mission, based on its initial mandate 






The failures that led to the reforms 
From the early implementation of the peace operations, the critics questioned 
missions’ ability to truly resolve conflicts.  In the mid-1990s, the three missions of 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia were simply considered failed missions.  The 
peacekeepers failed, or were put in a situation in which they were unable, to bring peace 
back in those areas.  The Haiti mission is not seen as a failure but the critics have 
questioned its efficacy.  The local population are still facing threats from criminal 
organizations, which have not been addressed by the peace operation.  The weak mandate 
of the mission is probably the reason why certain situations cannot be rectified 
(Cockayne, 2009).    
From the critics of the early deployments and from the critics of the present ones, 
came the different reforms.  The purpose of the reforms was to strengthen the capacity to 
effectively manage and sustain field operations.  The effects of a mission must go beyond 
providing initial relief: the host country must be able to independently maintain and 
sustain the implemented solutions.  To achieve this, policy makers have to intervene at 
the root of the problem and create lasting improvements to quality of life for local 
citizens.   
In 2000, the UN found itself confronting dilemmas regarding their peace 
operations.  Globally, demands and requests for the deployment of peacekeepers was 
increasing, but there were criticisms of the way field operations were managed.  
According to the UN, the three biggest challenges the peacekeeping operations were 
facing were; deploying its largest, most expensive and increasingly complex operations, 
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designing and executing transition strategies for operations where stability has been 
achieved, and equipping communities as much as possible with the capacity to ensure 
long-term peace and stability (UN, 2014).  
In order to analyse the shortcoming of the missions, in the spring of 2000, the 
Secretary-General created a panel, led by Lakhdar Brahimi.  The panel’s discussions and 
research gave rise to what we call today the Brahimi Report.  The panel offered numerous 
recommendations and noted the following: “in order to be effective, UN peacekeeping 
operations must be properly resourced and equipped, and operate under clear, credible 
and achievable mandates.”  (UN, 2014).  
We found that the recommendations made in the Brahimi report in 2000 were not 
achieved during the MINUSTAH mission.  The inability to achieve and meet the 
recommendations made by the panel of the Brahimi Report impacted how MINUSTAH 
was managed after the earthquake of January 12, 2010. This will be further explored in 
the Case Study to follow.  
The panel made twenty recommendations that were contained in the Brahimi 
report.   In the following paragraphs, we will focus on four: Peace-building strategy, 
Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy, Clear, credible and achievable mandates and, 
Civilian police personnel (UN, 2000). 
In the Peace-building strategy, the Brahimi report made four principal 
suggestions. The first is that a small part of the initial budget be made available to fund 
“quick impact projects”.   They recommended a shift in the use of police officers so their 
actions can reflect the new focus on the rule of law, and help to “improve respect for 
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human rights”.  In complex peace operations, they suggested that in the first phase of the 
mission, the law-making officials consider demobilizing and reintegrating programmes 
into the passed budgets.  Finally, the report suggested a plan be put in place in such a way 
that the UN would have the ability to create sustainable peace-building strategies. 
The panel had clear suggestions in the Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy section 
and they can be briefly summarised as such.  When peacekeepers are deployed, they have 
to have the ability to enforce the mandate in a professional and successful manner.  At all 
times, they have to be able to defend themselves and they have to be under the support of 
strong rules of engagement. 
The Brahimi report made four suggestions in the section on clear, credible and 
achievable mandates.  Before any peacekeeping operations be fully deployed the Security 
Council has insured that the agreement meets the requirements and standard for 
international human rights.  The panel recommended that the Security Council 
overestimate the number of troops in draft resolutions in order to ensure that ample troops 
are committed and arrive in the field.   The panel suggested that the resolution of the 
Security Council should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations especially in 
potentially volatile situations.  Finally, they suggested that a truthful and honest way of 
communicating has to be established between the Secretariat and the Security Council, so 
the reality of missions can be portrayed. 
The five recommendations made in the Brahimi report in the section Civilian 
police personnel were very important, but as we will see, some recommendations are still 
on the wish list.  The panel suggested that each Member State should have a standby unit 
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of police officers ready to go on a mission, on short notice.  The panel recommended that 
the Member States would respectively train the standby unit so the members could meet 
the requirements of the UN.  The report suggested that the Member States had a “single 
point of contact” where the police officers would be provided to the UN.  The panel 
recommend an on-call unit of 100 members which could be deployed on seven days 
notice.  This unit would be specially trained, so they would have the skills to manage and 
handle the majority of any new peacekeeping operations.  Finally, the panel suggested 
that specialists in judicial, penal, human rights and or similar domain should have a 
standby unit as well, and be ready to be deployed with the police officers. 
This research is focused on those four specific recommendations because we 
believe that they directly affect how police officers on the field perform their duty and 
interact with the locals.  There have been no peacekeeping operations that have fully 
satisfied the suggested reforms.  This explains some of the critiques and the lack of 
success of several recent missions.   
Arising from the recommendations of the Brahimi report there have been four 
major reforms: “Capstone Doctrine”, “Peace Operations 2010”, “2005 World Summit 
{A/RES/60/1}”, “High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change {A/59/565}”(UN, 
2014).  The first one focused on the principles that a peacekeeper has to follow on the 
field.  The second one was an elaboration of a reform strategy of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations.  The third was the establishment of the Peacebuilding 
Commission. The final reform was an attempt in setting a broader structure that would 
help in the establishment of future collective security.   
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In Haiti’s situation, the addition of an ‘unplanned’ natural disaster created the 
perfect storm for the mission to fail.  In the field, police officers argue that you cannot 
strategize for an “Act of God”.  In this research, it is not our objective to challenge the 
possibility of divine influence. Based on history and its geographical location, however, 
should policy makers always consider the high probability of natural disasters, in Haiti?  
In 2010, during the MINUSTAH mission, police officers have been declared the most 
important asset of the mission by the Argentinean Police Commissionaire.  The police 
officers have been utilised in numerous roles, but under the UN protocols, it was 
practically impossible for the police officers to apply the initial UN mandate.  For the 
police officers an important part of the mandate was to train the local police. 
In addition to the inability to implement the report’s recommendations at the 
suggested level, Haiti’s natural disasters are keeping the country in a constant state of 
potential complex emergency.  The US Institute of Peace further refined the definition of 
complex emergency as human-made crises and or national disasters that require an 
international response that extends beyond the mandate or capacity of a single 
organisation. The intervention can include military elements in order to meet security 
expectations.  This definition is the closest to the peace operations in Haiti, and will later 
be explored in more depth.  As we will see in this research with everything that is 
involved during a peacekeeping mission it was very difficult for the policy makers to 
follow or implement the recommendations and reforms in Haiti’s situation. 
The meaning of peacekeeping has changed in the eye of the public.  The roles of 
peacekeepers have changed and each mission is more complex than the previous one.  
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Peacekeeping in the original sense has almost become obsolete.  It has now entered an era 
where the peacekeepers are asked to focus on other aims, such as humanitarian aid.  The 
peace operations have become multifaceted, which was not the case in the past. 
(Pouligny, 2006)  At the present time, peacekeeping missions are multidimensional with 
multidisciplinary members.  The peacekeeping missions continue to facilitate the political 
process and the majority of their work focuses on protection of civilians. Peacekeepers 
are still continuing to assist in disarmament, disbandment and reintegration of former 
fighters.  Peacekeepers are also supporting the organization of elections, protection and 
promotion of human rights, as well as supporting restoration of the rule of law.   
The UN has had missions in Haiti since the mid-1990s. The missions’ mandates 
and the roles of peacekeepers have changed throughout that time; from a strong military 
component to directly and quickly provide security, to a capacity-building mandate 
intended to develop accountable security and justice institutions.  Currently the mandate 
has limited political support from within, but the mission is still attempting to restore 
Haiti’s constitutional rule (Cockayne, 2009).  In the next chapter we will analyse the role 
of the police officer in failed states. 
Police and development 
When it comes to peacekeeping the police officers are now involved in two 
important aspects of peace operations: security and development.  In this section, we will 
focus on the importance of police in society and more specifically on the role they play in 
development.  In developed, democratic countries, the role and the importance of police 
are evident. The police departments play a crucial role in enforcing the rule of law.  Some 
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may argue that the level of democracy of a country can be measured by the level of trust 
that its citizens have in their police.  Police officers are not only seen as physical 
enforcers when it comes to the law, they are the gates to the justice system.  Police 
officers are expected to provide protection to the population. They are supposed to reflect 
the image of the law, and they are the link between the citizens and the justice system.  
They have the dual role; that of community provider as well as law enforcer (Hinton and 
Newburn, 2009).   
The role of the police officers is now, more than ever, directly linked to the 
success of development.  As it has been mentioned and will be repeated in this research, 
peace has to be established for true development to occur.  Prior to initiating the peace 
process, there needs to be physical stability on the ground.  A stable situation on the 
ground allows policy makers to enter the failed state, have a direct view of the situation, 
and then make pertinent suggestions on how to begin the peace process.   Police officers 
have a crucial role to play when it comes to maintaining the security level in which the 
other social components can grow and develop.  Failed states and areas of the globe 
where conflicts cannot be resolved without the presence of armed forces are receiving the 
majority of the financial support, when it comes to projects focused on bringing back 
peace.  The belief is without effective and accountable policing, solutions to wider social 
issues will probably not be achievable (Hinton and Newburn, 2009).  
The UN sees the police officers as protectors of the civilians and since the 1990s 
they have been used as a tool to promote peace and security. During peacekeeping 
missions, in addition to provide security, peacekeepers train local police officers, and 
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support local and UN workers in humanitarian aid projects.  Their main objectives are to 
establish an atmosphere where the setting for sustainable peace and development can 
occur (UN, 2014). 
When a natural disaster occurs during a mission the platforms and the mandates of 
peace operations are seriously shaken and often damaged.  One of the focal points of this 
research will be on the role police officers play during peacekeeping missions. We will 
look at the work that has been done in Haiti throughout the years.  The HNP has been 
known to exercise power through demonstration of physical force in order to protect the 
ruler or the elite. This had to be reformed for the local population to regain trust of their 
police force. This reform fell under the mandate of the peacekeepers.  The culture of 
police had to be transformed into a disciplined and disciplinary institution that would 
focus on the protection of the well-being and security of the population (L. Zanotti, 
2008). 
 UN peacekeeping operations can be seen as a live organisms that needs to 
constantly change and adjust in order to respond to the challenges they face.  As we have 
seen in the previous paragraphs, police officers have a key role to play during the 
missions.  Peacekeepers bring security, but they also bring a sense of safety. “The routine 
encounters played out between blue helmets and host, whilst uneventful in the main, do 
over time accrete into a precarious and contingent security ‘mood’, ‘climate’ or 
‘feeling’.” (P. Higate and M. Henry, 2010:34).  In the field during MINUSTAH, the UN 
patrol vehicles and the presence of UNPOLs were often enough to temporarily settle the 
local population.  
36 
 
The role of police in democratization 
 A democratic political process is often challenged in failed states by the group 
that is forced to leave or abdicate their power.  I have seen firsthand when I was in Haiti, 
the volatility that arose during elections.  During this part of the mission, the main roles of 
the peacekeepers were to provide security and ensure the democratic political process 
would prevail. In terms of police and democracy, most believe that good governance and 
stable democracy are linked to the efficiency of the state police. The government, with the 
help of the police, have an important role in protecting the values promoted by 
democracy.  According to Marenin, without an effective police institution that is 
democratised, political democracy will not be achieved.  That connection is a key element 
when it comes to evaluating the success of democracy in a specific state.  (Marenin, 
1998) 
 No one would contest that security is important for a country, if only to ensure 
national sovereignty. The citizens’ sense of security in a failed state is often very low.  
One consequence of the majority of civil wars is an increased number of violent crimes.  
Police institutions have a key role in reinstating order, and the method that they  use will 
depend on the type of enforcement they normally use.  “Conversely, police who are 
effective in protecting individuals from criminal threats, who respect individuals’ rights, 
and who protect vulnerable groups regardless of ethnicity or political orientation can 
create a positive climate even when broader political arrangements are uncertain or less 
than democratic.” (Call and Stanley, 2001: 152).  In a politically corrupt state, with a 
repressive style of policing, concern for protection of human rights is often disregarded, 
especially after a major crisis. If the police institutions are mainly formed from one 
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specific segment of the population, without a strong government, they can potentially 
dominate the weaker group.This imbalance leaves some citizens vulnerable to abuse, and 
unable to trust in their police institutions.  
 
The importance of police officers 
 In the following paragraphs, a correlation between police work and development 
will be made.  With innovation in technology and the increased speed with which we  
receive news, we are now witnesses to tragedies that happen all around the world. Scenes 
of extreme violence caused by desperation can be seen on a regular basis.  The UN’s 
response involves deploying peacekeeping missions in which police officers are now a 
pivotal component.   
 The role of the police officers is crucial in restoring the feeling of security 
among the local people, establishing the rule of law, and actively engaging in activities 
that help to restore order. “Police must protect human rights, especially those rights that 
are required for the sort of political activity that is the hallmark of democracy.” (Bayley, 
2005: 19).  The police officers are facing numerous challenges.  One of which is to 
understand and represent a different culture, while promoting their own values.  Police 
officers face this challenge in their own country when they have to effectively manage the 
mandates of their government’s policies along with the actual work that needs to be done 
in the field.  One can only imagine the challenges they are facing when they have to 
enforce the law in a foreign country.  This is the time to question if the police officers in 
Haiti’s peacekeeping mandate could possibly accomplish what they are sent to do?  Does 
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the reality of what the police officers do in the field concord with what they are mandated 
to do? 
When analysing development projects in different countries, a direct link can be 
made between a safe and secure political process and a viable police and justice system in 
which they can properly operate (Wilson, 2006).  “Security and development”, 
“humanitarian aid via military intervention”, the “police work in a peacekeeping mission 
are seen as the most important part of the mission”, the “establishment of the rule of law”: 
all of these terms and sentences have been used and said by the policy makers in the last 
decade. I had the opportunity to represent the UNPOLs at meetings where the person in 
charge of the police officers and the person in charge of the civilian members agreed and 
declared that in Haiti, the work of the police officers in the internal displaced camps was 
the heart of the mission.   
Due to political, cultural and geographical reasons, Haiti’s situation has not 
improved.  In 2004, when the international ranking of the richest countries was released, 
Haiti ranked 153 out of 177 countries (UN, 2012).  After all the damages that were caused 
by the earthquake of January 12, 2010, Haiti dropped in the bottom five, when it comes to 
the poorest countries in the world.  The UN increased the numbers of police officers in 
response, and during the worst of the situation, they planned to have approximately 5000 
international police officers spread across the country.  The next few paragraphs will 





The roles and values of police officers 
Honesty, Integrity, Professionalism, Compassion, Accountability and Respect are 
the values that are promoted by Canadian police officers.  These values are taught in 
different missions around the world, where Canadian police officers are deployed.  We 
believe that it is important to determine if the training done by police officers helps 
development.  It is important to research if the values they are promoting on the field will 
improve the livelihood of the local population. 
One of the objectives of this research is to analyze the roles of police officers in a 
peacekeeping mission.  In this section, from the perspective of the Canadian Police and 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), we will take a closer look at the roles of 
UNPOL in the Haiti peacekeeping operation. The first role is ‘Police Mentor’.  In this 
role, the police officer will oversee the implementation of the agreed framework for 
compliance to professional standards by national police officials and assist them in their 
efforts to deliver democratic police services. They will also provide on-the-job training to 
local police, either individually or in a group setting.  The second role is ‘Police Advisor’.  
In this role, the police officer will provide on-the-job training, advice and mentorship to 
their counterparts within the local police structure to ensure that law and order are 
maintained effectively and impartially and that human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are fully protected. 
The third role of an UNPOL is ‘Police Trainer’.  In Haiti, this is the main role for 
police officers.  Trainers contribute to the planning and implementation of activities to 
fulfil the mission mandate. They are responsible for assessing and identifying current 
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standards and meeting essential training needs of police officers in Haiti, in accordance 
with the requirements of the mandate. This includes basic training, specialized and 
refresher training, as well as specific career development/promotion courses.   
Finally, the last role of an UNPOL is ‘Humanitarian Support’.  In this role, they 
will support the delivery of humanitarian aid by assisting in establishing and maintaining 
a secure environment.  They engage in proactive patrols to maintain public order and 
security. This may include especially harsh and difficult areas such as displaced persons 
camps. (RCMP, 2012)  The principal role of police officers around the world will always 
be to serve and protect their own citizens.  Sometimes in failed states, the local police 
officers are unable or reluctant to do so.  In those cases the international community is 
called upon to offer the same kind of protection (International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, p.viii). 
In conclusion of this section, the thesis would like to emphasize the importance of 
the role of police officer in the success of a mission.  As was mentioned, missions are 
more complex and are becoming very challenging for policy makers.  The challenges 
police officers faced in the early missions were demanding; the challenges police officers 
will face in the future peace operations will be even more difficult.  Police officers have 
to deal with the mandate of reforming the local police and implementing the additional 
goals of the UN.  In the field trying to accomplish all those objectives at the same time 
can be seen as “trying to build an airplane while you’re flying it”  (Col. Chip Lewis 
quoted in Frayer 2007).  Unless an unforeseen change occurs, the roles of the UNPOL in 
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Haiti will remain the same.  As we have seen in the past, occasionally Mother Nature has 
a way to change things from difficult to complex overnight. 
Complex emergency 
Complex emergencies can be seen as a combination of internal conflict with major 
displacements of the local population caused by famine or food deficiency.  It also 
involves fragile or failing economic, political, and social institutions.  All those elements 
added to a natural disaster, and created what we call a complex emergency (WHO, 2012).  
As previously mentioned, police officers have to serve and protect the population and 
they have to promote the values noted above while doing so. They often find themselves 
in positions where they simultaneously have to play multiple roles. This is a challenge in 
itself, and in some cases, peacekeepers have to intervene in situations that are described 
as complex emergencies. 
In the late 1980s, the expression ‘complex emergency’ surfaced on the African 
continent.  It became a buzz term during the Gulf War, and it was clear then that the term 
applied not only to a situation caused by a natural disaster.  “For the UN, a complex 
emergency is a major humanitarian crisis of a multi-causal nature that requires a system-
wide response.” (Duffield, 1994).  
Prior to the earthquake of January 2010, the UN mission in Haiti had mainly been 
humanitarian in nature, and the peacekeepers’ main objectives were to maintain order and 
help solidify the HNP.  After the earthquake, Haiti was thrown into a state of emergency; 
a complex emergency situation. I can speak first-hand about the situation, based on the 
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nine months I spent in Haiti. I can attest to the challenges and complexity we faced and to 
the changing-nature of the peacekeeping mission in the wake of the natural disaster.    
There are key elements that will worsen or prolong a complex emergency 
situation. One such element is the strength of local government institutions. If 
government institutions do not have the ability to help the population, or if they are too 
weak to defend the population against any type of danger, the emergency situation will be 
prolonged. There are a variety of triggers which may cause a complex emergency. A 
natural disaster could put a country in a situation of complex emergency over night; a 
long lasting genocide could also put a population into a complex emergency.  In both 
situations, the weaker the government institutions are, the longer the complex emergency 
situations will last (Albala-Bertrand, 2000). 
The mission in Haiti was a unique situation.  The earthquake devastated the 
country both physically and emotionally.  One very important aspect of the mission that 
was not covered by the media was the effect the earthquake had on the civilian members 
of the UN.  In this research, the emotions UNPOL members had to overcome will be 
discussed in future chapters. One issue that was quietly raised by the UNPOLs was the 
overwhelming challenge of fulfilling the civilian mandate as well as their own.  In 
defence to the civilian members, even with the best pre-deployment training, they could 
not have been prepared for the event, especially the mass loss of life.  This was the 
biggest difference between how the civilian and the peacekeepers reacted to the situation.   
Even in 2010, the platform of the peace operations was constructed for a more 
predictable world.  The current day situations that peacekeepers face are increasingly 
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complex and require the decision makers to act on a multidisciplinary level.  The 
peacekeepers are now challenged to their limits in many different ways; they confront 
extreme levels of poverty and human suffering, they mediate intense inter and intrastate 
conflicts, and often have to manage the UN mandate and respond to a situation of 
complex emergency (Duffield, 1994).    
As previously mentioned, according to the UN statistics branch over 3000 
peacekeepers have lost their lives over the years in all the different missions. As the 
peacekeepers are trained to perform and conduct their duties in stressful situations, they 
are aware of the possibility that the unfortunate may happen.   The earthquake was 
not the first time people died in Haiti during a UN mission.  However, this was the first 
time that such high numbers had died in such a short period of time.  After speaking with 
UNPOLs that were present during the earthquake, it was clear that any training they had 
received was irrelevant on the day of the earthquake. They were deeply and strongly 
affected.  It created fear in the civilian population, the kind of fear that can only dissipate 
with time.  But Haiti needed help and they needed it fast.   
In the twelve months that followed the earthquake, the mission worked to help 
millions of affected Haitians. All levels of the UN workers and all the NGOs were also 
affected in a variety of ways: no one was left untouched. They also had to manage a 
cholera outbreak, which after a lengthy investigation, was discovered to be caused by a 
Nepalese peacekeeper.  Then hurricane season arrived, which was more devastating than 
normal because of all the people that were relocated to tent cities.  Furthermore, Haiti 
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went through two violent rounds of elections.  The decision makers had to confront 
different quandaries, which all required swift action: nothing could be postponed.   
The earthquake, the cholera outbreak, the hurricane season, along with a violent 
election, caused a very high number of deaths.  The personnel that participated in the 
search and rescue efforts following the earthquake were powerfully affected by the 
gruesome scenes they faced. Field workers and peacekeepers had only tents and tarps to 
offer those in need of shelter, and despite being warned of the dangers, local families 
moved back into unsafe buildings.   It was evident that the required responses would be 
far more complex than those used in conventional peacekeeping missions.                                                                                          
To address the symptoms and redress the underlying causes complex 
emergency involves the development of a composite response strategy 
and doctrine, which embraces the many different development, 
emergency aid, diplomatic and military agencies which may become 
engaged in an ad hoc incremental manner (Philip Wilkinson, 2002: 67).   
 In the upcoming sections, we will demonstrate that there were numerous examples 
of situations where the wrong decisions were made due to the fear the earthquake and 
aftermath generated.  A great deal of difficulties arose from that dreadful day, but in our 
opinion, the emotional scars that were left in the field will be permanent. The apparition 
of fear was the most harmful predicament.   It affected the population, it influenced the 
UN civilian members, and it changed the way the UNPOLs and the policy makers did 
their work.  
  Part of the mandate of the police officers in MINUSTAH was to participate in 
the development of Haiti; one way they were trying to achieve that was by training the 
HNP.  After the earthquake, they were unable to continue training, as they had to focus on 
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doing police work without executive power.  The UNPOLs did not have the required 
resources, training and/or abilities to fulfill their mandate in a complex emergency 
situation. 
Finally to understand the thesis statement of this research, it is important to 
understand the earthquake of January 12, 2010 put Haiti in a situation of a complex 
emergency. As discussed, this can be described as a humanitarian crisis in a country or 
state where there is total or extensive breakdown of power resulting from internal and/or 
external conflicts, and demands an international response that goes beyond the mandate 
or ability of any single or multiple organizations (OCHA, 1999).  The thesis statement 
will be developed in more detail in the next section.  
Thesis statement 
 Since 1995, the UN has deployed peacekeepers to Haiti, with the objective of 
restoring order and promoting a fair, democratic political system.  Within that mandate 
the peacekeepers had to create and establish a viable Haitian police force.  When we 
analyse the blueprint of peace and development, security is now identified as a 
foundational pillar.  There is a push from the UN, supported by the US, to ensure and 
impose security protocols first and then focus on development.  With the change of focus 
in the development theories, where security and development have now merged, can the 
police officers truly represent the local population while promoting the UN values?     
This research will argue that after the earthquake of January 12, 2010, the 
UNPOLs were ill equipped to face all the predicaments caused by the natural disaster.  
The situation of Haiti, which was bleak to begin with, became almost unmanageable 
46 
 
overnight after the devastating earthquake.  The peace operation had to shift focus from 
development, to suddenly devote skills and human resources to saving lives.  When we 
look closely at the roles of international police officers, during the peace operation 
MINUSTAH, we believe that in the complex emergency situation which resulted from 
the earthquake, the UNPOL could not carry out its initial mandate.   
This research will attempt to explain how a complex emergency affected the way 
peacekeeping operates, and will attempt to demonstrate how the police training aspect of 
the mission had to be abandoned as a result. Finally, we will discuss how the UN’s 
response was influenced by the clear priority of security, which superseded the 
development objectives.  While most observers might consider the UN’s response after 
Haiti’s earthquake to have been typical, we believe the response was neither effective nor 
sufficient.  We believe due to the political history of Haiti and its geographical situation, 
the UN should have been better prepared to face such a devastating event.   
Methodology  
Research Method  
This thesis explores the problems encountered by UNPOL in achieving its 
development mandate, as part of the UN’s MINUSTAH mission carried out in the 
complex emergency experienced by Haiti after the 12
th
 of January, 2010 earthquake.  The 
bulk of the data is drawn from my participation as an UNPOL officer in Haiti between the 
22
nd
 of June 2010 and the 22
nd
 of March 2011.  This was supplemented by analysis of UN 





UN publications and documents helped support the thesis statement.  Some of the 
documents date back to the 1970s, and some are as recent as 2014.  The same methods 
were used for the data collection on the RCMP and the UN.  Included in this data were 
reports concerning the involvement of the UNPOL during the mission, from both RCMP 
and UN sources.  Those reports were daily police reports as well as civilians’ reports 
created by both the RCMP and the UN.  
The bulk of the evidence in this thesis comes from my involvement as a UNPOL 
officer and as a result I had access to confidential documents and information provided by 
the RCMP that were used in training and the carrying out of my daily activities. These 
provided general background information but since they are confidential they cannot be 
cited directly. 
Participant Observation 
  Participant observation was developed from the motivation on the part of 
sociologists to describe and understand patterns of life.  Those patterns were observed in 
different parts of society using non-obtrusive methods (Tesch, 1990).  During the 
mission, I held dual roles. I was an outsider to the local population and the HNP and at 
the same time I was an active UNPOL officer working in the Internal Displaced People 
(IDP) camps.  It is important to understand this was one of the biggest challenges of my 
mission.  I had to play dichotomous roles: on one hand be the observer who took notes, 
accepted and documented reality, and on the other hand be an engaged participant, able to 
think on my feet and interact with the local population and the HNP.  I had direct orders 
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which I had to follow for obvious operational reasons.  While performing the regular 
duties I witnessed the effects of the UN decisions on the local population and the HNP.  
For the purpose of this thesis, I focused on the effects the decisions made by the UN, after 
the earthquake had on the UNPOLs, the HNP and the development part of the 
MINUSTAH mandate.  
The main objective of a researcher as a participant observer is to watch and listen 
(Punch, 1993).  As a trained police officer to watch and listen almost becomes a second 
nature, I made it a religious habit to transform my observations into analysis.  During the 
day, I recorded my findings and observations, with remarks on specific events. I would 
then compare my notes to the training I received prior to deployment.  I would analyse 
the difference between what I was told during training and what I experienced in field.  
This was the first time I was involved as a participant observer, and with the help of the 
thesis supervisor I was able to interpret the information gathered. It is important to 
mention that based on the method that I chose, what I observed and described could not 
be duplicated or reproduced, as these events were unique in a very specific situation 
(Hammersley, 2004).   
Conclusion 
 To fully appreciate the extent of the challenges I faced during the mission as a 
participant observer, a deeper reflection is necessary.  As was described, the role played 
by UNPOLs was vital to the success of the mission. As a UNPOL, I had direct and 
specific orders that I was required to follow based on the situation on the field.  As we 
will see, the training I received created expectations; expectations that were not met. The 
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situation of complex emergency that was shaped by the earthquake produced a fracture 
between the initial mandate (my expectations) and what I was asked to do on field.  I 
recognized that this was a very unique moment in time; I arrived only 6 months after the 
earthquake, and was there for a period of nine months.  This created certain limits in the 
findings.  The mission occured during the reconstruction phase and the UNPOLs had an 
increased security role; after the earthquake this was inevitable.    
As a participant observer, I was able to see that some of the problems in the field 
should have been handled differently, and based on Haiti’s history, I feel that the UN 
should have been better prepared to face such an event.  My experience on the field and 
this research revealed that if certain recommendations had been followed, a more 
effective and swifter response could have been executed by the UN.  I saw firsthand the 
development aspect (training) of the mission for the UNPOL put on hold. This was a 











Chapter II: The UN in Haiti 
Background  
Introduction 
 In the second chapter of this thesis I will link Haiti’s political history, the natural 
disasters that are influenced by the country’s geographical location and the Haitian 
culture of police.  This research will review key elements of Haiti’s history and the 
political regimes it has been under.  The research will look at all the peace operations that 
were deployed and their change of mandate through time.  An overview of the HNP will 
be made, as well as an enumeration of some of the challenges that the UNPOLs 
encountered.  This will help explain the current mandate of MINUSTAH and will support 
our assertion, that the UN should have been better prepared to face the devastating effects 
of the earthquake of January 2010. 
Haiti’s situation 
After over 200 years of independence, Haiti is still struggling and today it is one 
of the poorest countries in the world.    Numerous internal, external, and environmental 
forces have sculpted Haiti into the country it is today.  The next few paragraphs will give 
a chronological overview of keys events that shaped Haiti and gave us the country of 
today.  
 In 1492, Christopher Columbus discovered the island that he then named 
Hispaniola or Little Spain.  In 1496, the first European settlers arrived and established 
themselves at Santo Domingo, which is now the capital of Dominican Republic.  Two 
hundred years later in 1697, Spain conceded part of the island to France and they named 
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it Haiti or Land of Mountains.  In 1801, Toussaint Louverture, a former slave, conquers 
Haiti.  He abolished slavery and proclaimed himself governor-general of all Hispaniola.  
A year later, Charles Leclerc, Napoleon’s brother-in-law, tried to conquer Haiti’s interior 
without success (Coupeau, 2008).  At this stage of history Haiti was seen has a sign of 
change and hope with regard to the abolishment of slavery. This was the precursor of 
many events that happened in the colonized islands.  “Antislavery militants hoped that the 
Haitian Revolution would force whites to accept black’s humanity and presented Haiti as 
the guardian of the rights and privileges of African American in the New World.” 
(Coupeau, 2008:34). 
In 1804, Haiti officially became independent and Jean-Jacques Dessalines 
declared himself Emperor.  Two years later he was assassinated and Haiti divided along 
ethnic lines into a black-controlled north and a mulatto-ruled south.  For almost 30 years, 
Pierre Boyer was able to unify Haiti, but he excluded blacks from power.  From 1843 to 
1915 there were a total of 22 different heads of state in Haiti, most of them focused on 
their own gain, with very little effort made to develop the country and its citizens.  The 
frequent changes of regime that create numerous political leaders lead to a fragile state 
with weak policies (Coupeau, 2008).  
In 1915, the USA invaded Haiti.  The Americans believed the conflict endangered 
its property and investments in the country.  Although the USA had withdrawn its troops 
from Haiti since 1934, they had maintained fiscal control until 1947.  Haiti was used and 
controlled by foreign business groups and the economy suffered because Haitian leaders 
were unable to negotiate terms that would benefit the country.  There were similar results 
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during the American occupation; the Haitian economy did not thrive while the American 
merchants had very lucrative deals (Coupeau, 2008). 
It was then the Duvalier dictatorships began.  In 1956, Francois “Papa Doc” 
Duvalier took control via a military coup and was elected president the following year.  In 
1964, he declared himself president for life, and with the help of his militia Tontons 
Macoutes he established a dictatorship.  “Macoutisme” embodied all the deficiencies of 
Haiti, including exploitation of the people, abuse of the economic system, and physical 
support of a non-democratic state, dishonesty in the form of bribery and fraud and 
violence  (Fatton Jr., 2002).    In 1971, “Papa Doc” died and was succeeded by his 19 
year old son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier.  He also declared himself president for 
life.  In 1986, “Baby Doc” fled the country as a result of international and internal 
political pressures.   
During those two reins of power and terror the Haitian social predicaments did not 
improve (Quinn and Sutton, 2013).  In 1988 after a military coup, Haiti was governed by 
civilians, but under military control.  In 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected 
president, in what was known to be the first free and peaceful election.  A year later he 
lost his power after another military coup.  In 1994, the USA was able to reinstate 
Aristide in power. In 1995, UN peacekeepers replaced American troops.  In 2000, 
Aristide was elected for a second term.  In 2004, Aristide was overthrown (Fatton Jr., 
2002).  In 2006, Rene Preval won a controversial election, and in 2011, Michel Martelly 
won the second round of presidential election (Quinn and Sutton, 2013). 
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Due to its geographical location in the Carribbean, Haiti has been devastated by 
storms and hurricanes.  In the floods of 2004, over 2000 people died.  In the fall of 2008, 
approximately 800 people were killed due to a series of storms and hurricanes.  That same 
year more than 500 children were buried alive when a school collapsed.  On January 12, 
2010, up to 300 000 people were killed when the 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck the 
capital Port-au-Prince.  Since its creation, the people of Haiti have been victimized by 
governments, both local and foreign.  Haiti has been devastated by natural disasters.  
Since its independence, the international community has been observed the 
“development” of Haiti. 
In early 1990s Aristide won the first open and democratic election by a landslide, 
but his polarizing political views upset the local elites and disturbed a lot of the foreign 
leaders.  In a country with the history of Haiti this was almost the perfect recipe for a 
coup d’état.  Only seven months after his election Aristide had to leave the country after 
military attacks.  The following three years saw Haiti’s situation worsen.  After long 
negotiations the American military, under President Bill Clinton’s leadership, supported 
Aristide re insertion into power.  This came with serious conditions: “Aristide agreed in 
1994 to implement the Strategy of Social and Economic Reconstruction” (Coupeau, 2008: 
135).  After that Haiti’s situation was seen as an international one, the economic embargo 
of Haiti followed.  The leaders of the military coup refused to negotiate with Aristide, in 
July 1994 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 940, which gave power to a 
multinational force to enter Haiti and reinstate Aristide.  The troops, which were made up 
of American military personnel, successfully demobilized the military dictatorship and 
returned Aristide to power (Coupeau 2008). 
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UN in Haiti 
In Haiti the UN has been involved in many facets of social and public 
establishments.  The UN have been in Haiti under various programmes titled: 
International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) (February 1993 – August 1993), 
United Nations Mission In Haiti (UNMIH ) (September 1993 - June 1996), United 
Nations Support Mission In Haiti (UNSMIH) (July 1996– July 1997), United Nations 
Transition Mission In Haiti, (UNTMIH) (August 1997- November 1997), United Nations 
Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) (December 1997 - March 2000), (UN, 
2014)  
  The UN’s main goals were to stabilize the country, bring economic growth and 
establish a democratic government.  The involvement of the UN did not stop there; they 
were also involved in building better health and education systems (UN, 2014).  Security 
was an important issue in Haiti.  In 1995, the United Nations began to provide support to 
the Haitian government under the peacekeeping operations. This research focuses on the 
peacekeeping operations, more specifically, on the deployments that occurred after the 
earthquake of January 2012.   
It can be said that Haiti has been victimized by numerous complex emergencies, 
which although similar, cannot be dealt with in the same manner.  The peace operations 
responses have to be customized to surmount all the different obstacles that they face.  
They have to be suitable to the political conditions of the time (Wilson, 2010).  The 
following paragraphs will review the ratified missions that occurred in Haiti and their 




The peace operations  
The International community and more specifically the UN Security Council have 
been supporting the presence of peacekeepers in Haiti since 1993.  The first mission was 
“Mission des Nations Unies en Haïti” (MINUHA, 1993-1996), in which the peacekeepers 
were in charge of modernizing the Haitian forces and creating a new police force. (UN, 
2014)  It was followed by “Mission D’Appui des Nations Unies en Haïti” (MANUH, 
1996-1997), during this peace operation, the objective of the peacekeepers was to 
improve the professional skills of the police, to maintain the security condition, and to 
work on the stability of the country in an effort to successfully implement a new national 
police force. (UN, 2014)  Then came “Mission de Transitions des Nations Unies en Haïti” 
(MITNUH, 1997), in which the main goal of the peacekeepers was to encourage and to 
contribute to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP).  It was 
followed by “Mission de Police civile des Nations Unies en Haïti” (MIPONUH, 1997-
2000), in which the goal of the peacekeepers was to assist in the professionalization of the 
HNP (UN, 2014). 
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, “Mission des Nations Unies 
pour la stabilisation en Haïti“ (MINUSTAH) was established on June 1
st
, 2004 by 
Security Council resolution 1542.  MINUSTAH is the fifth approved mission of this 
country (UN, 2014). This UN mission succeeded a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) 
authorized by the Security Council in February 2004, after President Bertrand Aristide 
was exiled from Haiti after numerous armed conflicts within the country.  “The blueprint 
for the UN understanding of its mission in Haiti is the governmental rationality that had 
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accompanied the formation of states in Classical Europe – that is, disciplinarily and the 
‘science of police’.” (L. Zanotti, 2008:554). 
The MINUSTAH mission was implemented to help the Haitian police force gain a 
level of professional competency  and to maintain the security conditions and stability 
required  for successful implementation of a national police force.  This mission would 
build on the mandates of previous missions which have been described above. The 
mandate of MINUSTAH consists of ensuring a safe climate, as well as, a stable one to 
support the political process in progress and assist the Government.  It is important to 
mention the three pillars of the mandate of MINUSTAH: safe and stable climate, respect 
of the political process and human rights. The mandate was modified after the earthquake 
that struck Haiti in January 12, 2010 (UN, 2014). 
Changes in the mandate 
If we analyze the situation of Haiti, since the initial deployment of the civilian 
police officers in 1995, the different missions have had similar mandates, but the violence 
and instability are recurrent.  
In the peacekeeping operations, the international community had to remodel their 
theories so it merges social topics and security as core parts of the new mandates.  “The 
WDR 2011 calls for a paradigm shift in the development community’s work on FCS.  
The proposal paradigm is that violence and other challenges plaguing FCS cannot be 
resolved by short-term or partial solutions in the absence of institutions that provided 
people with security, justice, and jobs.” (IMF, 2011,p.iii).  There was a change in the 
Haitian mission’s mandate, as there was a change in mandate in the peacekeeping 
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operations in general.  The SMART programs, which were the guidelines throughout the 
1990s, were replaced by what is called the three “Rs”.  The focus of the missions when 
they were under SMART was more on monitoring and they were very limited in their 
extra curriculum activities.  The three “Rs” allowed or forced the peacekeepers to be 
involved in reform, restructuring, and rebuilding tasks.  The criteria for selection of the 
peacekeepers had to change because of what the demands of the missions evolved. The 
need for peacekeepers with strong policing skills was still very present, but now on the 
field the missions also needed peacekeepers with management and administrative abilities 
(Greener, 2009).  The next paragraphs will explore some of the difficulties that the 
UNPOLs are facing in Haiti.   
 
Challenges of the United Police Officers in Haiti 
One of the challenges of the peacekeepers during the Haiti mission was to reform 
the local police, the HNP, into an organization that is considered qualified through the 
lens of the international community.  The HNP needed a cultural change to bring them to 
a level of professionalism that would meet the standards of the international community. 
To help the creation of a sustainable national police force, the peacekeepers had to 
simultaneously infiltrate and integrate the HNP.  Initially the UN had to replace the local 
authorities with the peacekeepers (Hayley, 2001). 
The HNP is the first police organization in the history of Haiti.  After the 
reinstatement of Aristide in 1994 and the abolition of Haitian military, it was the perfect 
scenario for Haiti to create a new organisation that would handle the security of this 
volatile nation (Depestre, 2004).  In January 1995, the Haitian police academy was 
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created and in 1996, Pierre Denize was selected as the first HNP Director General 
(Donais, 2005).  A lot of expectations from the Haitian population and the international 
community came with the establishment of the HNP.  But with all the difficulties 
(financial and political), corruption quickly penetrated the organization, and high hopes 
changed to despair.  The national police, who at first was seen as the key player in 
bringing the country into a great stability level, were no longer trusted by the Haitian 
people. This situation had created a bad relationship between the police and the local 
population, in which very little confidence is shown (Stromsem, and Trincellito, 2003).    
During the peak of its recruitment program there were almost 6500 HNP officers. 
By 2003 that number was down to 3000. Those numbers seem to vary every year, Global 
Security has the number of HNP member at a little over 8500, but according to the 
Haitian Secretary of State for Public Security, Reginald Delva, there are now 10 000 HNP 
officers.  He also said that they want to increase the number to 16 000 by the year 2016.   
Almost 20 years after the first UN mission, the challenges in Haiti remain the 
same. The most predominant problem continues to be the culture of corruption that is 
greatly supported by the lack of pay of the HNP officers.  The international community 
and the UN have put a lot of effort into reform of the Haitian police, but this has been, 
and continues to be, a great challenge.  When we look at the political rationale of the UN 
for the HNP it is clear that they want to change the mentality from that of ‘vigilante’, to a 
recognized and respected organization that supports human rights (Zanotti, 2008). 
One of the mandates of the peacekeeping operations is to protect the people. As 
explained by Cockayne, in Haiti’s situation there are two groups that offer protection to 
the population.  The first group offers physical protection, to the people and the land, the 
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UN peacekeepers fall under that group.  The second group focuses more on what the 
enforcement world calls ‘the feeling of security’.  As the national police the HNP falls 
under that group.  But in order to keep power, a group will go as far as creating a threat to 
legitimize their presence.  It is beneficial for them to keep Haiti in the terrible condition 
that it is presently in.  That creates the danger that Haiti might find its self in a permanent 
state of corruption, where the locals in every sphere of society are extremely vulnerable to 
bad influences (Cockayne, 2009).   
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter we were able to see how 200 years of geographical and political 
turmoil have shaped Haiti.  Since the involvement of the UN in Haiti, there have been 
five missions including MINUSTAH.  The UN had numerous objectives in those 
missions; from modernizing the Haitian forces, to the creation of a national police, to 
increasing the level of professionalism of that newly created national police.  Safe and 
stable climate, respect of the political process and human rights, were the three pillars of 
the mandate of MINUSTAH.  That stable climate was supposed to help establish a 
democratic political process which would entrench the respect of human rights.  If all that 
would have been accomplish there would have been tremendous progress in the 
development of Haiti.  
Numerous reforms have been attempted and more will have the same fate if the 
culture of corruption of the HNP and Haiti is not addressed or taken into consideration. 
As we will see in this particular case study, the earthquake paralyzed much of the 
development program for almost a full year.  The training section for the HNP had to be 
60 
 
temporarily closed.  The UNPOL could not be spared for training as they were needed on 
the field for rescue and recovery tasks.  In the next section, we will look at a personal 



















Chapter III: The operation on the ground   
Introduction 
 In this chapter we will look at the roles I had in the MINUSTAH mission from the 
22
nd
 of June 2010 to the 22
nd
 of March 2011.  We will examine what I was told I would 
do and compare it to what I actually did.  We will make a connection between all my 
actions during the nine months I was in Haiti and MINUSTAH’s mandate, as well as 
policing and development.  We will also look at the specific steps of a deployment.  
Following the days of the earthquake of January 12, 2010, the RCMP began recruiting 
candidates that would have an interest in doing a peacekeeping mission in Haiti to 
volunteer.   
 I was born in Haiti and lived there for the first four years of my life.  I was 
fortunate enough to become an RCMP officer and I always wanted to give back to my 
birth country. It was not difficult to explain and convince my loved ones why I needed to 
go.  In this section I will describe the preparation of a police officer prior to the mission.  
I will describe how the mandate was explained to the individuals involved, and then I will 
illustrate what we really did in the field.  I will explain how the difficulties and the 
failures of the mission were embedded in the new reality that was caused by the situation 
of a complex emergency.   
 The three pillars under which MINUSTAH was operating were:  to work towards 
a secure and stable environment, political process and human rights.  The UNPOLs were 
mainly involved under the secure and stable environment pillar.  This is where the 
creation, transformation and training of the HNP were supervised.  The pillar of political 
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process covered all main actions that would promote a democratic political process.  The 
third pillar which was the most important for the international community, human rights, 
included every operation that would promote human rights (UN, 2014).   
 In Haiti as UNPOL we had a very weak mandate, due in part because we did not 
have executive power.  By executive power we are referring to the law enforcement 
aspect.  The UNPOLs were not allowed to investigate, interview or interrogate the locals 
nor do basic police work without the presence of the HNP.  The following paragraphs will 
explain why this became problematic.  Part of the frustration was due to the fact that the 
UNPOLs were in a situation where they had to ask permission from the HNP who they 
were supposed to be training. 
Preparation and expectations 
Police officers as UNPOL 
 “The main objective of the UN Police is ensuring compliance with the UN mandate as 
well as international criminal justice and human rights standards.” (RCMP, 2014)  In this 
sub-section, we will explain the role of a UNPOL according to the Canadian police or 
more specifically the RCMP.  The thesis will describe the principal roles of a UNPOL. 
a. Police Mentor 
Mentors will oversee the implementation of the agreed-upon framework for compliance 
to professional standards by national police officials and assist them in their efforts to 
deliver democratic police services. They will also provide on-the-job training to local 
police, either individually or in groups. 
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b. Police Advisor 
Advisors will provide on-the-job training and advise and mentor their counterparts within 
the local police structure to ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and 
impartially and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected. 
c. Police Trainer 
Trainers will contribute to the planning and implementation of activities to fulfil the 
mandate of the mission. They will be responsible for assessing and identifying the current 
standards and essential training needs of police officers in Haiti in accordance with the 
requirements of the mandate. This includes basic training, specialized and refresher 
training, and specific career development/promotion courses. 
d. Humanitarian Support 
Support the delivery of humanitarian aid by assisting in establishing and maintaining a 
secure environment.  Share information with NGOs and respond to varying concerns 
identified in the field. “Proactive patrols to maintain public order and security. This may 
include especially harsh and difficult areas such as displaced persons camps.” (RCMP, 
2012). 
 
 In this case study, the “advisor” role was essentially non-existent.  When we 
arrived in June 2010, I began to work in Cité Soleil and there was a major problem 
between the HNP and the UNPOLs.  I was not able to discern the root of the problem but 
the local people needed help, and we were forced to work together.  The local police had 
some respect for the Canadian police officers, but as far as taking advice or guidance, we 
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were far from that.  The trust had been broken which disrupted the advising aspect of the 
mandate. 
 Even if the local police would probably not admit it, the “mentor” aspect of 
peacekeeping was very present and quite efficient.  Not to give ourselves too much credit, 
but with Canadian colors on our shoulders a lot was expected of us, and a lot of respect 
was given to us.  Due to the high expectations of the Canadian members, we were 
scrutinized by our peers from other countries.  In this section of this paper, I will not 
criticize members from other countries but I will state that their caliber and experience in 
police work, as well as the requirements for their members to be accepted on the mission 
were not equivalent to ours.  The local police officers were not fooled by a “bêret bleu”.  
They disliked members of some countries.  They questioned the presence of UNPOLs 
that were coming from countries that were as weak politically and as corrupt, if not more, 
than Haiti. 
 The “security” aspect of the mission was the easiest one to identify and 
accomplish.  During my time there, I began working in Cité Soleil, which is one of the 
most dangerous cities in the country.  I then worked in the Internal Displaced Person 
(IDP) camp, where the country needed the UNPOL because they did not have enough 
police officers to cover the area and to control the new population that was created 
because of the earthquake of January 2010.  
 Many other factors contributed to the challenging security situation:  hurricane 
season, the cholera which was brought by the UN (Nepalese battalion), and two rounds of 
elections. As well, we had to provide security support to all the civilian volunteers, and 
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members of all the NGOs who were working to help Haiti.  In some cases we received 
tremendous assistance from the army.  I will continue this section by describing what we 
did in the two training weeks in Ottawa prior to the deployment. 
Pre-deployment, Training 
 I will now briefly explain the process that a member has to go through prior to 
deployment; this will help explain our state of mind as we entered the mission.  For a 
Canadian member to qualify for the Haitian mission, a member needs to have a minimum 
of 5 years of service at the time of application.  The member has to clear the physical and 
psychological tests, and then successfully complete the interviews conducted by both the 
RCMP and a member of the UN.  Upon completion, I felt excited and proud to have been 
selected. 
 I then began two weeks of training in Ottawa.  This is when and where the 
Canadian police, led by the RCMP, ensure that your file is flawless. They must be 
confident that the candidates they select are worthy and fully understand the expectations 
of the mission.  They have two weeks to go through your personal and professional 
history.  On the tactical aspects of the process, every member has to be recertified in the 
use of force and the use of every weapon that will be given to them.  I was the junior 
member of my contingent, I had five years of service, which when I reflect back, 
completely influenced my behaviour during the mission. I felt that I had to prove to the 
senior members that I truly belonged among them. 
 The first point of concern about the mission arose during the two weeks in 
Ottawa. We had all the paper work which was, doubly and triply checked.  However, only 
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one day was allotted for cultural awareness.  There were approximately six hours planned 
to prepare the members for the reality of Haiti.  In comparison to the majority of the 53 
countries present in the mission, Canadian members were better prepared and better 
equipped.  This is probably why the Canadian police officers and the Canadian officials 
had such high expectations in regards to our roles in this particular mission. 
Expectations 
 The majority of police officers had dreamt of saving the world, not as a developer, 
but as a superhero.  After a couple years of service, there is a major reality check about 
what true police work is and the non-gratifying aspect of our chosen career.  When a 
member has an opportunity to serve on a peacekeeping mission that old dream of saving 
the world comes back. In this specific case, it was even more amplified because the 
RCMP went coast to coast to find the right candidates.  When it comes to this mission 
specifically, all the candidates were asked what they expect from the mission.  There were 
numerous answers but, directly or indirectly, the candidates wanted to have an impact on 
the local population.  The candidates wanted an opportunity to have a positive and lasting 
influence on the local police.  As it was explained to us, this was how we would help in 
the reconstruction phase; this was how we would participate in the development of Haiti. 
 During the training in Ottawa, we were told that we would be teachers and 
mentors, and participate in humanitarian aid.  The Haiti mission is an armed mission and 
depending on the stability of the country, we were expected to do security work as well.  
As it was explained in the previous section, a peacekeeper will only use his weapons in a 
situation of self defense or to defend a civilian.  Based on the risk assessment of UN 
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security, the UNPOLs in MINUSTAH would always be armed.  After talking to members 
that had experienced the Haiti mission, I was expecting to work with the HNP and 
depending on where I would be posted, teach and support them in developing a better 
police force.  Based on the requirements that were needed to be part of the mission, I was 
expecting my future coworkers from the different countries to be very professional, as we 
will see this was not the case. 
Arrival 
 My mission started on June 22, 2010, which was more than six months after the 
earthquake.  Based on the information I received during training, I was expecting the 
majority of debris to have been removed and reconstruction to be started.  When we 
arrived, the mission seemed to be on pause.  It was no longer chaotic, but no one seemed 
to know in what direction the next steps should be taken.  I expected, and hoped, to have 
a tremendous adventure and I knew it would not be easy.  I did not expect the biggest 
problems that I would have to deal with would be with the UNPOLs and UN 
management. 
 In my humble opinion, the most important point when it came to expectations was 
the difference between the information given to us and the reality of what was happening 
in the field.  In defence of the individuals that were providing the training, there was not 
yet any real data collected since the earthquake. They did what they could with what they 
had.  One part of our duty was to report to them so they could properly prepare the 
following contingents. When we arrived in Haiti, the civilian peacekeepers were seeking 
information from the police officers to understand the extent of the damage caused by the 
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catastrophic event.  High expectations from the police officers, in addition to field 
assessments based on very little data, were the perfect mix for a hard reality check shortly 
after arrival.  
 
In the field 
The acclimatisation period 
 The senior members had warned me that it would take me from four to six weeks 
to acclimatize myself to the mission.  The weather, the isolation, the slower pace of 
dealing with things and the reality of being away from my family for so long would 
definitely affect me. 
 The first week and a half was a mini-version of the training we had in Ottawa. In 
the induction period, I had to qualify with my firearm, complete an oral, written and 
reading test (a grade 8 level at best), and we had to do a driving test.  Surprisingly, the 
driving test was where UNPOLs failed the most.  The induction team were making sure 
that the new police officers had the minimum requirements.  Canada was one of the only 
countries that actually trained their members for this specific mission.  Other UNPOL’s 
had no knowledge of what to expect from either the country or the mission.  Suddenly 
those six hours of cultural training did not seem that bad after all. 
 During the induction, we were interviewed by people who would be comparable 
to staffing or human resources.  Once again you have to explain why it is good for the UN 
to have you here in Haiti and what can you bring to the mission.  This is where things 
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became complicated for the UN. The requirements of a Canadian police officer were not 
the same as the requirements of a police officer of other countries, and with five years of 
service, I was more qualified and more trained then a lot of members from other 
countries.  Under UN policy you cannot have one country that controls everything during 
a mission; they look for what they call the “National” equity. Therefore, highly qualified 
members with numerous years of service found themselves at the bottom of the command 
hierarchy.  Personally it was not a problem, but a lot of my Canadian colleagues had a 
hard time working for someone with less experience and knowledge.   
Cité Soleil 
 My first posting was in Cité Soleil, the other members of my contingent were 
concerned about the high level of violence in this city.  Cité Soleil is a slum that was 
known to be one of the most dangerous cities in the world.  The city was controlled by 
armed gangs who created lawless neighborhoods. MINUSTAH had numerous armed 
operations that began in 2006 and by 2009 the mission had been able to restore law and 
order to the area.  The HNP said that MINUSTAH was the key factor in re-establishing 
security in the city (UN, 2014).  I was the first Canadian in months, if not years, to be 
posted there.  This posting greatly influenced the decisions I would make for the rest of 
the mission. 
 The other UNPOLs were surprised to see a Canadian member in Cité Soleil and 
one of the first questions I had to answer was about how long I was going to be there.  I 
would always answer the same: “I am here to stay a minimum of three months”.  This 
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was the time required before asking for a rotation. If you did not like a posting, they 
would appreciate if you would try to stay there for a third of the mission. 
 In Cité Soleil, the role of an UNPOL was what they called collocation. We were 
supposed to patrol everyday with the HNP and do check points.  As UNPOL, we were 
expected to monitor their actions and give advice and feedback on their work.  One 
common trait among police officers, that seem to be present no matter the origin of the 
police officer, is that we are all ‘alpha’ personality type.  Some members of the HNP had 
a hard time accepting the fact that strangers were coming to their country telling them 
how to do their work.  The HNP were even selective and they, at times, refused to receive 
any advice from members from African countries.  The HNP members had a lot of 
respect for the Canadian, American and the French members. 
 There were two schedules: the day shift from seven in the morning to three in the 
afternoon and the evening shift which was from three in the afternoon to ten at night.  
During the training in Ottawa, the officers in charge were unaware of the situation 
between the UNPOL and the HNP.  When it happened, no one seemed to know, but there 
was a major fracture in the relationship of the UNPOL and the HNP.  When we arrived 
many of the HNP refused to work with the UNPOL. 
 This last point is very important in understanding the uniqueness of this mission.  
Our main mandate was to train the HNP, to patrol with them and be invited to participate 
as mentors in their investigations.  This was the legal and practical agreement between the 
UN and the Haitian government.  Without going into much more detail, we were not 
supposed to work without the HNP, and unless someone’s life was in danger (in front of 
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us) we could not intervene.  Telling a group of well trained and excited police officers 
that they cannot intervene is the best way to crush their “superhero” dreams. 
 A week and a half after I started in Cité Soleil another Canadian police officer was 
sent to my post and together we started to change things.  Everyday we would go into the 
HNP office and ask if anyone would come and work with us, we did not care about their 
skills or gender, we just wanted someone.  Every day we had conversations with highly 
ranked officers of the HNP.  It took us approximately three weeks, but before I left for my 
next posting, we had made friends with some HNP members.  Normally their supervisor 
would lend us one member for the patrols which was a tremendous improvement.   
 Being bilingual (English and French) helped me a lot during the mission, even if it 
was supposed to be a French mission, a surprisingly high number of members could not 
speak or understand French.  The Team Leader of Cité Soleil used my linguistic skills in 
meetings and debriefings, which helped get me noticed and gain credibility with the other 
members.  During a mission, as a police officer, there are two ways to survive.  Either 
you try to make a difference no matter what the situation and you roll with the punches or 
you hide for the duration of your mission and count the days until the end.  Unfortunately 
some members chose the easier road. 
 An important challenge the UNPOLs faced throughout the entire mission is self–
explanatory: security.  In this paper, I mentioned the uniqueness of this mission.  One of 
the reasons the mission was distinctive, was that UNPOLs had to juggle all the roles 
previously described and, at the same time, represent law enforcement.  I can personally 
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say that there was some confusion between the roles that police officers played during the 
mission and their expectations.   
 The humanitarian relief aspect of the mission was also confusing because it was 
not really in our mandate in the field, but was often mixed with or under the umbrella of 
security.  We had to ask permission from our superior (which was almost never denied) to 
go and work in the orphanage.  These were the true moments of the mission because we 
knew we were not going to win a medal for courage, but when you saw those kids smile 
after receiving toys and books we managed to bring in the country, it was definitely worth 
it.  This was our mission within the mission; this is what I hope will stay with me forever.   
 I decided to volunteer to go work in the Internal Displaced People camps (IDP).  
This was a risky decision, but as far as I was concerned, I just survived Cité Soleil where 
we had been attacked and even had shots fired in our direction.  I was dealing with 
internal conflicts that were unfortunately created by the UN.  Other than my Canadian co-
worker, no one from developed countries had been sent to that post for almost a year.  It 
was time for a change. 
IDP Camps 
 The police commissioner came and gave us a long speech, explaining that we 
were now the heart and soul of the mission.  We would work in extreme conditions, and 
we would see poverty like we never seen before, but for the mission MINUSTAH to 
survive we had to do an excellent job.  At the beginning, we were separated into two 
units: the mobile patrols and the permanent camps.  Having worked in general duty not 
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that long ago and feeling the need for a little bit of action, I asked to work in the mobile 
patrol. 
 After having numbers of long conversation with the other UNPOLs, we believed 
that the mobile patrol unit in the IDP camps were doing what we considered police work.  
When the unit was fully operational, there was 24 hour coverage, separated into three 
shifts.  We still had some difficulties in working with the HNP, but because they were 
aware of the importance of our presence and the importance of the work we were doing in 
the camps, we had HNP members that were assigned specifically to our units. 
 This was a very unique situation, because the initial mandate of a UNPOL was to 
mentor and monitor the HNP.  On the more quiet days, we were supposed to help with 
humanitarian aid. We were not supposed to do police work as we know it (patrolling, 
investigating, arresting people), but the earthquake created a need for a policing unit.  
Some camps had more than 50 000 people and before NGOs and the civilians could begin 
their work, order had to be restored. 
 At first, I was in charge of 6 members from Nepal, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, 
New Guinea and Jordan.  Our first mandate was to locate and identify the camp which 
caused the members a lot of frustration. The mobile patrol unit was put in place at the 
beginning of August, and almost eight months after the earthquake. Prior to that, nothing 
seemed to have been done at the ground level.  Once we were more familiar with our new 
environment, I directed my members go into out on the field and meet the people living in 
the camp.  It was mandatory that each member actually walk in the camps and take some 
time to talk to the people.  It was community policing at its best. 
74 
 
 Our second mandate was to ask the people about their needs and find out what 
could we do to help however, this mandate created problems as well.  The locals were 
afraid of the police as a result of the very direct and physical way the HNP had handled 
situations.  It took us a long time to gain the trust of the people, because we were working 
with the HNP.  Another problem we had to face was that some of the UNPOL’s were 
experts in their fields, such as undercover, swat team, close protection, detective, which 
has nothing to do with community policing.  It was a steep learning curve, even if they 
had many years of service.  Finally, it was strange to us (UNPOL) when civilian workers 
of the UN were coming to ask us about our findings, as they were supposed to give us 
information and tell us where to go and what to do. 
 One month later, I was named Team Leader of one of the mobile units and I was 
put in charge of 30 members from all around the world.  We were now three units 
covering day and night shifts and our zone was the whole Port-au-Prince area.  As a Team 
leader, I had to spend 25% of my time in the office dealing with paperwork and 
scheduling.  I was fortunate enough to spend the rest of my time on the field with my 
crew.   
 Each camp had a committee, led by a president, and we had to establish a good 
rapport with that president if we wanted to have any kind of relationship with the people 
living in the camps.  There were days that we helped the NGOs during the distribution of 
goods.  As a Team Leader, I was able to dictate where we were going to spend our 




 In the last three months of my mission, I was Coordinator of the IDP camps.  I 
was in charge of all the mobile units made up of 140 people.  I was supposed to spend 
75% of my time in the office, dealing with meetings, staffing, and lot more of paperwork.  
I managed to be in the field almost half of my time.  The Unit Commander agreed with 
my argument that we needed a Coordinator in the field to watch over operations.   
 I had done community policing in different communities in the Halifax area but I 
would not be able to compare the level of appreciation that we were receiving in the IDP 
camps.  As a Coordinator, this is where I had most influence as I met with different group 
of civilians workers of the UN.  I sat on the relocation committee of displaced people and 
I was able to witness the stress and frustration because very little progress had been made 
in that regard.  
Complex Emergency from the field  
 The mission in Haiti was a very unique situation; the earthquake devastated the 
country both physically and emotionally.  One very important part of the mission that was 
not covered by the media was the earthquake’s effect on the UN civilian members.  In 
this paper, I mentioned some of the frustrations that arose among the UNPOLs because 
we felt as if we were doing the civilians mandate as well as ours.   
 A year after the earthquake, I had the opportunity to speak to civilians that were 
present during the event. I came to the conclusion no matter how much preparation they 
received, they were not prepared to lose some of their members in a situation of danger. 
Police officers are always aware of the real and present possibility that life might be lost 
in the line of duty.   This was not the first time people died in Haiti during a UN mission.  
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However, this was the first time that such a high number had died in such a short period 
of time:  it was shocking.  After talking to the police officers involved in the mission, it 
did not matter what kind of training they received, the event affected them.  It created fear 
for the civilians, the kind of fear that can only abate with time. 
 Within twelve months, the mission had to deal with the earthquake affecting 
millions of Haitians, all levels of the UN workers and all the NGOs. No one was left 
untouched. In addition, there was a cholera outbreak which a lengthy investigation 
discovered to have been was caused by the UN itself. This was followed by a hurricane 
season with was devastating consequences because of all the people living in the tents.  
finally, Haiti also went through two volatile rounds of elections. 
 We had to deal with so many different important things; we were never able to 
postpone any activities.  The earthquake, cholera and the hurricane season along with a 
violent election  that lead to a high death toll.  I personally did not participate in the 
search and rescue that was done after the earthquake, but the members I spoke to could 
still remember the smell left by all the dead bodies.  I saw families moving into unsafe 
buildings and we did what we could to explain to them that they should not live there.  
But we did not have other options for them, and they did not want to live in a giant tent or 
under tarps.  During the peak of the cholera outbreak, I had to teach all my members how 
to keep themselves safe, because I insisted that we continue to go into the dangerous 
zones.  I helped Doctors Without Borders and taught the locals and the people living in 
the IDP about basic hygiene. 
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 During the elections, I transported civilians with the voting ballots.  I have seen 
voting posts completely destroyed, rocks being thrown at the members and the civilians.  
I witnessed people being killed because they were not voting for the ‘right’ people. 
Despite all these disruptions, the policy makers in New York declared that it was a 
successful election.  Someone was burned alive in the second round because he was 
refusing to vote for the popular party, and we considered that a successful election?  To 
restore order in the city, we had to open barricades on the streets and drive through 
flames.  I saw the despair on the people’s faces in the IDP camps when they were cut off 
from the world for three entire days. 
 I spent the first four months building a rapport with the HNP and the local 
population.  I honestly believed that when and if trouble was to arise, we would do our 
best to help them both.  During the elections, there were many riots and, as previously 
mentioned roads were blocked, shots were fired, but it was nothing that we had not 
planned for.  I did not question the decision of UN security to keep the civilian volunteers 
at home, but in the worst of the riots when the cities were in flames, surprisingly they 
decided to keep us (The UNPOL!) home, as well.  This is a peace mission and the 
earthquake created a fear among decision makers even if they did not set foot in Haiti.  I 
personally have never felt as ashamed to be a police officer until the day I had to answer 
the phone and tell the people of the IDP camps that we could not go and help them. 
 I was able to see the smoke caused by the flames.  I had to follow orders and send 
all men and women home.  The following day my supervisor had to go against UN 
security and we did what we were getting paid to do.  The relationship between the HNP 
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and the UNPOL was not good before those events, and after that they simply avoided us. 
We understood why.  
 I could have picked numerous examples of situations where the wrong decisions 
were made due to the fear that was created by the earthquake and the massive loss of life.  
There are a lot of effects that resulted from that dreadful day, but the fears that were 
created, in my opinion, were the most damaging one.   It affected the population, the UN 
civilian members, the UNPOL and the policy makers. Decisions were not made with clear 
minds; decisions were made in fear.  
 
Analysis and reflections 
My experience in relation to the mission’s objective 
 
 My expectations constantly changed during the nine months I was in Haiti.  I was 
born in Haiti, this was the first time I returned since I had been adopted and moved to 
Canada. I had numerous personal and professional goals.  For the purpose of this paper, I 
will focus on the professional aspect of my expectations. 
 When people ask me about the mission, I quickly respond that it was an eye 
opener.  It is somewhat obvious that I would be shocked by some of the things I saw.  My 
knowledge of Haiti, due to my origin, were above average but still not great.  During the 
training, the instructor described it as a reconstruction period.  When we arrived, 
however, part of the cleaning had not even been completed.  They spoke about the IDP 
camps and how we were supposed to work in them, but when we arrived nothing was in 
place yet. Because of this, numerous members went to work in different units or float for 
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the initial period of their mission.  We did not participate in the first part of the mission; 
the reconstruction. It was not directly in our mandate, but a lot of members were 
expecting to be part of it at some level. 
 What I remember of the first 6 six weeks was: confusion, repetition, and 
frustration.  We were confused and surprised about how the UN was so unorganized and 
how difficult it seemed for the UN to make a final decision.  It was repetitive because 
there was a lack of communication between the units.  We were extremely limited in our 
abilities to work as UNPOL and it was almost impossible to have someone understand 
what was expected from the initial mandate.  All that adjustment, in addition to the 
communication problem with the locals and the UNPOL’s from other countries, mixed 
with home sickness created a lot of frustration. 
 Then I was transferred to the IDP camps, the mandate was clear and easier to 
follow.  Community policing, was the heart of the mission.  As I was moving up the 
ladder of command, so was my level of confusion and frustration.  The UN was insistent 
on having the UNPOL do foot patrols and interact with people and to produce a report at 
the end of each day.  If we think about how we do work back in Canada what they 
requested seemed simple. The problem was that more than 50% of the members working 
in IDP camp units could not speak nor read French or English.  They had no knowledge 
of the Haitian culture and were unable to speak or learn Creole.  It is extremely difficult, 
nearly impossible, to do community policing when you cannot communicate with the 
people you are serving. 
 During the elections our mandate was clear; hold a safe election for the Haitian 
people.  We did our best to keep it safe for the population, but very few supervisors had 
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experience on how volatile and violent an election could become in third world countries 
like Haiti. On the field, it was chaotic and dangerous at times.  Fortunately, no members 
were severely hurt, and at the end of it, the headquarters in New York were happy with 
the results.  I hope that the administration have learned from this experience, because we 
did not have enough members for the elections, and some had to make the terrible choice 
of protecting themselves or the public.  A new president had been elected along with a 
new government that was supported by the international community.  It is in place and it 




 My nine months in Haiti were a tremendous experience, in which I had the chance 
to work with police officers from all around the world and with different domains of 
expertise.  There were a lot of frustrations, especially on the administrative side of the 
mission. During the meetings, the police officers felt that the policy makers in New York 
could not truly understand the reality of the field.  I went on the mission with numerous 
goals, one of them was to gather information on the training of the HNP and if it was 
applicable, use that information in my thesis.  Due to the earthquake, the development 
section of the mission was shut down for practically eight months, the focus was on 
reconstruction, humanitarian aid and security.  Due to the uniqueness of the mission, I 
was introduced to the notion of complex emergency, and it was at that specific moment 
that the mission began to make sense. 
 I am subjectively fascinated by the roles of the police in the UN peacekeeping 
mission.  I am still interested in the importance of security in development.  The UN has 
clearly stated the importance of the civilian in the Haiti mission, MINUSTAH.  There 
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were  numerous occasions throughout the mission which demonstrated the importance of 
the police. The UNPOL went from having an important support role to being the heart of 
the mission.  A question came to my mind regarding the mission:  if the police represent 
and reflect the society that they serve and if they are the heart of the mission, is the 




















Chapter IV: Conclusion 
We will address some of the unanswered questions in form of recommendations.  
This research focused on peacekeeping and more specifically on the reality the UNPOLs 
that participated in the Haiti mission MINUSTAH after the earthquake of January 12, 
2010.  This case study brought a unique perspective, because I was enrolled as a 
peacekeeper for nine months in Haiti from June 2010 to March 2011.  This was an 
opportunity to bring field work and academic research together.  This research provided 
an overview of the UN peacekeeping mission and an historical overview of the 
peacekeeping missions in Haiti.  In the thesis statement, we answered the main question 
of this research and declared the peacekeepers and UNPOLs during the peace operation 
MINUSTAH, were unable to carry out their initial mandate, as a result of the situation of 
complex emergency after the earthquake.  Finally, this research brought the reader inside 
the point of view of a peacekeeper that had to face the challenges of working in complex 
emergency conditions while attempting to maintain the mandate of the UN. 
Peacekeeping in review 
As has been explained in this paper, the early stages of global peacekeeping 
operations were mainly to observe, monitor and support the peace process in interstate 
conflicts.  The peacekeeping missions of the UN have contributed in the peace resolution 
in numerous ways.  The missions were used as a security measure during the negotiation 
period.  The peacekeepers were used as mediators during interstates conflicts.  From the 
beginning the “blue helmets” were arguably the most recognized insignia of the 
peacekeeping missions.  From those early interventions arise more complex ones and UN 
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peacekeeping missions are now involved in multidimensional operations.  In the early 
1990s a clear change in the peace operations mandates occurred.  The missions are 
longer, involved in both intra and interstates conflicts and the policy makers had a 
different mindset when it comes to conflicts resolution. 
The failures of some of the missions of the 1990s required policy makers to 
change the way they viewed and managed the peacekeeping operations.  In Haiti’s 
situation, in the early deployments, the peace operations were led by the United States.  
Canada took over with a more complete mandate.  The platform under which the Haiti 
peace operation was based was part of the new way the missions were going to be 
conducted.  The mission had to be planned and deployed in an integrated fashion between 
the civilian and the military.  All the main objectives and the secondary objectives had to 
be expressed from the initial draft. The deployment of the mission had to be made in a 
swift manner.  The mandates had to be reasonable, achievable and had to match the 
resources available.   The mandates of the missions had to be created in a way that some 
flexibility could be allowed depending of the situation.  Finally, if the peace operations 
were in a situation where a long term commitment might occur, the host country and the 
international community have to understand the majority of the consequences of this type 
of mission. 
As of now, no peacekeeping operation has met all these criteria.  Policy makers, 
critics and the international community agree on the fact that a change in focus of peace 
operations needs to occur.  A focus on defending human rights and finding sustainable 
solutions for the failed states were key pillars of the future platforms of peace operations. 
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A successful peacekeeping operation would be one in which all peacekeepers in the field 
and the civilian aspects of the international aid complete their mandate and exit the host 
country.  The host country should have a sustainable and achievable plan of action for the 
period immediately after the departure of the UN.  The evaluation of the success of a 
mission will be based on the achievement of the initial mandate as well as the 
accomplishment of the modifications made to the mandate during the peace operations.  
The true measure of success will be determined long after the mission has been 
completed. It will be considered a true success if the host country is left in a secure and 
stable situation, in which the local population is self-sustaining.  As previously 
mentioned, since early 2000, ‘Security and Development’ are now linked to one another.  
This notion influenced the reforms of the peacekeeping missions.  Under the human 
security agenda the mission became more complex and the international community 
found new energy and means to support the peace operations.  
The Haiti mission was a significant example of the new challenges the policy 
makers are facing and it is also an excellent illustration of what the peacekeepers will 
have to do in the future.  The peace operations have to implement new strategies that are 
multidimensional, and are now involved in the judicial system, governmental institutions 
and health care programs.  The expression “thinking outside the box” is often used when 
innovative ideas are required. In Haiti’s situation, preparing for the inevitable should have 
been used.  The UN, under different mission names, has been involved in Haiti for over 
30 years, the core of the problems are similar.  The consequences of earthquake were 
devastating, but they should not have put on hold the development aspect of the mission, 
especially concerning the development of the HNP.  
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The literature review and the observations from the field revealed that with the 
constant evolution of the missions and the increasing complexity of the missions 
influenced the role of the police officers as peacekeepers.  The establishment of the rule 
of law, the creation of a fair judicial system in which the local population trust, and the 
development of a professional national police will support sustainable peace.  As 
mentioned in this research, police officers are now a key element in the success of a peace 
operation.  In Haiti, the peacekeepers are directly involved in the training of the local 
police, in supporting human rights and supporting a democratic political process. As has 
been demonstrated in Haiti’s situation, UNPOL can become heavily involved in security 
and humanitarian aid if the situation requires.  We argue that based on Haiti’s political 
history and geographical location, the tragic event should not have come as a surprise and 
a contingency plan should have been in place: it was not.  
The tipping point: Complex emergency 
In a complex emergency, can the mandate of the peacekeeping mission be fully 
applied by the international police officers in the field or should the focus be on law 
enforcement?   One answer to the first part of the question is, yes, if previous 
recommendations had been implemented.  One of the recommendations of the Brahimi 
report was the commitment of human resources; that a permanent group be ready for 
deployment in situations of need similar to the earthquake.  During this mission we 
noticed that when the peacekeepers’ numbers on field reach an optimum, every aspect of 
the peacekeeping mandate could have been fulfilled.  The mandate of the mission must be 
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clearly stated, and the roles of the police officers have to be approved by both the host 
country and the international community.   
The natural disaster cannot be ignored, depending on how damaging it is, the 
answer to the question above might be no. As was explained in Haiti’s situation, the core 
of the country was destroyed by the earthquake.  The initial mandate was put on hold for 
what they called the rebuilding period.  During that period, the police officers had 
numerous roles, from humanitarian aid where they had to support the NGOs, to security 
in which they supported the local police.  Six months after the earthquake the 
peacekeepers’ focus was still on security. When they had the proper numbers on the 
grounds the peacekeepers’ centre of attention was still on security.  That is why under the 
new international consent of security first, the peacekeepers could not fulfill the initial 
mandate of the mission. 
The initial mandate, for the police, was to help in the democratization process and 
help train the local police.  Shortly after the earthquake, this was put on hold for security 
and law enforcement.  During that period, the initial mandate could not cover what was 
required from the peacekeepers in the context of a complex emergency.  With the initial 
resources available this was expected.  When I began the mission, the full mandate of the 
peacekeepers should have been re-established.  Since 1995, the UN has deployed 
peacekeepers with the objective of restoring order and promoting a fair and democratic 
political system.  With the change in focus in the development theories where security 
and development have now merged, can the police officers, which are currently the main 
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actors of the peacekeeping missions, truly represent the local population while promoting 
UN values?   
The local population sees the peacekeepers as their main source of contact with 
the UN.  The peacekeepers are the buffer between the policy makers and the civilians.  It 
can be very challenging for peacekeepers to make the link between the mandate of the 
time and actual requests from the population.  
Following the initial mandate is challenging, with the addition of a natural disaster 
that put the country in a state of complex emergency, it can be seen as unrealistic to 
expect the peacekeepers to fulfill their mandate.  The volatile political history of this 
country can explain some of the reasons why the policy makers were reluctant to fully 
return the peace operations to its initial mandate.  Under Haiti’s predicaments they had no 
choice, but to put on hold parts of the main mandate.  From the field’s perspective policy 
makers did not know when to re-establish the original mandate, even when the 
peacekeepers provided reports proving that the situation was stable 
Case study 
This case study proved that the three big challenges that the UN were facing in 
regards to the peacekeeping operations in the early 2000s, were still present in 2010.  The 
missions are increasingly larger and more complex.  The duration of the missions force 
the organizers to implement transition strategies, but an exit strategy should remain a vital 
point of any mission.  Finally, the creation of a sustainable solution that would increase 
and support peace remains elusive.   
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I was involved as a peacekeeper for nine months after the earthquake of January 
12
th
, 2010 in Haiti.  This humbling experience gave me an opportunity to work with 
military employees, UN employees, NGOs, civilian workers, police officers, locals and 
individuals from more than 55 different countries.  I faced two reality checks: the first one 
was the difference between my expectations based on the training and the reality of what 
needed to be done in the field.  The second was the clash between the lectures received 
and what was happening every day in the tent cities.  At that time the training did not 
match what was happening in the field. There was not enough time allotted to the field 
training of the HNP, the peacekeepers found themselves doing law enforcement, police 
patrols, without the HNP.  The peacekeepers did not have executive powers, consequently 
could not operate without the HNP.  The IDP camps were supposed to be temporary but 
they are still present today.  As a Coordinator of the mobile patrols of the IDP camps, I 
saw the reports from the field and was submitting summary reports to mission officials.  
Even with positive reports, the focus remained on security. 
As mentioned in this research, the HNP had been receiving training from the 
international community and the UN since 1995. I was expecting it to have an established 
police academy to which UN peacekeepers would provide support.  Even if the HNP had 
high ranked officers in charge of the academy, the UNPOLs were still very involved in 
the training and very little follow up was done when a cadet was leaving the learning 
establishment.  As we have seen, the earthquake temporarily closed this section and the 
involvement of the peacekeepers was reduced to a minimum.  Were my expectations too 
high?  For the field training aspect of the formation of a police officer, perhaps they were.  
Field training happens after the academy and this when police officers to execute the 
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police duties.  The field training is such an important aspect of the overall program in 
Canada, I was surprised this was not implemented.  The training academy had everything 
in place to properly function on its own, but the UN was not relinquishing control of it to 
the HNP. 
   Another finding was the fact that the earthquake put fear into everyone who was 
working in Haiti during that period.  This fear greatly affected the work of civilians, the 
UNPOLs had to gather statistical data for them, especially in remote and more dangerous 
areas.  This had an effect on the rebuilding process and was not part of the mandate of the 
peacekeepers. This case study supported the researcher’s thesis statement by 
demonstrating that, not only at the peacekeepers level, but at the policy makers’ level, 
under a complex emergency situation, the initial mandate could not be completed.  As per 
the literature review, the recommendations of the reforms for peacekeeping had not been 
met and influenced the decisions making during the mission.  The focus of the 
international community on security first, then development prolonged the focus on 
security long after the situation on the field was deemed stable and safe.  In the actual 
peacekeeping circumstances, with Haiti environmental situation and its unpredictable 
political history, a complex emergency can jeopardize the mandate of the mission. 
Recommendations 
As has been described and argued in this research, peacekeepers that were put in a 
situation of complex emergency after the tragic earthquake of January 12
th
, 2010, were 
not able to fulfill their initial mandate.  I wondered what could have helped the peace 
operation to maintain its mandate and provide the support needed on the humanitarian 
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side of the mission.  In reviewing all the personal notes I took, it became evident that two 
topics were noted most often.  During the training and prior to deployment, the 
information given to the members needed to be more accurate.  I understand that we 
arrived only six months after the earthquake and the civilians were still at the stage of 
gathering more information, but that should have been explained in greater depth.  If that 
had been accomplished, it would have helped those deployed to have more reasonable 
expectations and gain a better idea of the reality peacekeepers were facing.   
In the field, there was a clear human resource issue.  The international community 
and the UN have been mentioning for years through the numerous reports and reforms, 
like the Brahimi report, that the peacekeeping mission needs an institutional change. It 
requires more commitment from both the financial side and the human resource side and 
the implementation of clear and achievable mandates.  The second point is the important 
one that affected the deployment.  We believe that there were enough peacekeepers 
deployed but the tardiness of their engagement was one of the issues.  It is a long process 
to obtain all the security clearance required to work in another country.  If the UN would 
have a team of peacekeepers ready for special deployments to go anywhere when needed, 
they would dramatically increase the quality and swiftness of the response in case of 
complex emergency.   
A potential topic for future research would be the feasibility of such teams. Can 
countries afford to lend their military and police officers to the UN for three to five years?  
Is it economically and politically realistic to have a multidisciplinary team that would 
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have the ability upon request, needs, or international decision, to go and operate in failed 
states that would be facing a critical situation? 
On the history of peacekeeping, I noticed that certain missions are very long in 
duration; for example in Cyprus (UNFICYP) established in March 1964, in Syria 
(UNDOF) established in June 1974, in Lebanon (UNIFIL) established in March 1978, in 
the Middle East (UNTSO) established in May 1948.  Although their mandates have been 
modified, those peace operations are still ongoing.  In Haiti’s case, the missions have 
changed names but the UN keeps coming back. These were not the subject of my 
research, but since the early 2000s the international community seems to be reluctant to 
fully conclude peace operations in Haiti.  Every successful mission should have an end 
date, where the host country is stable enough, and where the host country has been 
empowered by the effort of the mission to properly govern itself. 
Finally, another area of potential research would be to follow police officers in the 
peacekeeping role from beginning to the end of a mission and then interview them a little 
while later.  During the mission, I worked with police officers from 53 different countries 
and had the opportunity to keep contact with a small group.  The difference the mission 
has made in their lives is quite surprising and the reality of the mission is very different 
depending on which country they are coming from. 
I feel this research was important because peacekeepers will continue to be used 
for a long time.  Since 1948, 68 missions were deployed in all corners of the world.  
Currently they are 15 active missions.  Peacekeeping missions and operations are one of 
the most efficient and effective tools, due to their possible ability to adapt.  It has been 
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demonstrated in this research that the international community, especially since 9/11, has 
made it clear that there is a direct link between security and development. One of their 
first methods of response in support of a failed state facing an internal or external conflict 
is the deployment of a peace operation.  The peacekeepers and the developers are directly 
linked.  I experienced it first hand and this research gives the point of view of a 
peacekeeper to the readers.   
This research touches both the professional and academic fields of interest of 
mine. The managers of police officers have to recruit individuals with the skills and the 
capacity to adapt quickly during a peacekeeping mission.  For the development of the 
failed state, the policy makers in charge of a peace operation have to include development 
of a strong national police into the final solution.  Finally, this research proved that we 
need the peacekeepers in field to do the front line work in multiple ways, but at the same 
time we need the policy makers to find ways to empower the peacekeepers to perform 
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